

Trail Six

AN UNDERGRADUATE JOURNAL OF GEOGRAPHY

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Editors' Note

Eva Lillquist and Rory Babin

nce again, undergraduate students of the Department of Geography at the University of British Columbia have produced a truly remarkable array of papers spanning the human and physical geographies. Could there be any other way? As interactions with our environmental conditions produce responses and consequences that affect both the human and physical worlds, can there really be a separation between the two? It is the aim of Trail Six to bridge the Great Divide, to investigate and account for these lacunae between the two.

A common thread found in the eight published papers this year was the open-endedness of the issues at hand. Each paper is an indicator of much larger social, economic, political and environmental forces at play in our world. As increasing notions of uncertainty about the state of the world have infiltrated both popular media and academic discourse, one cannot, in any instance, remove the text from the context in which it was written. These papers are a response to the times, and the historical conditions that still play out in the present. It is within this wider, macrolevel context that we decided to give Volume Three of Trail Six the theme of "Uncertainty."

Along the way, there has been uncertainty at the micro-level as well. As a publication, Trail Six is by no means immune to the global forces at hand. From the journal's beginnings in the muse of its authors, into the editorial board room where the theme of this issue was developed, onto the professor's desk for structural suggestions, under the copyeditor's scrutinizing pen in search of loose ends, spread onto the designer's computer screen for layout, and finally into your hands, Trail Six's final pages represent the combined efforts of dedicated undergraduates, graduates, professors, and staff in this department, all in the effort to get the voices of UBC Geography students heard in the best possible way. But along the way there was always uncertainty: about funding, about deadlines,

about subscriptions. Trail Six is a microcosm of the world of geography, one that we all inhabit.

The list of thank-yous and acknowledgements stretches far beyond the page allotment for this editor's note. Professors, students, staff, editors, designers, photographers, librarians and the UBC community are to thank. It is with great pleasure that we bring to you Volume Three of Trail Six: an undergraduate journal of geography!

Eva Lillquist and Rory Babin Editors-in-Chief, Trail Six, March 2009

Foreword

Graeme Wynn

nly those who been involved in editing and publishing really know the work required to produce a collection such as this issue of Trail Six. Behind the nicely-turned finished product, with its glossy cover and impressive content, its careful layout and consistent citation style, lie hours of work, by authors, volunteer members of the editorial board, those who offered comments on the papers, the editors who gave this publication shape and life, and others recognized on the acknowledgments page. The little volume that you now hold in your hands is a tribute to all of these people. But it is much more. Trail Six is, in some broader sense, the product of the UBC Geography community. The papers included here were written by Geography students in Geography classes taught by Geography professors. The very existence of Trail Six owes everything to the enthusiasm and commitment of members of the Geography Students' Association, who developed the idea of an undergraduate journal of geography four years ago and who have now brought three issues into being. And beyond this, of course, Trail Six reflects the engagements of UBC Geographers, students and faculty alike, with broader currents of concern and practice coursing through the global community of geographical scholarship.

The editors of this volume suggest that "Uncertainty" is the theme of this issue of Trail Six, because, they say, "many of the papers ...[take] an uncertain, and almost apprehensive, slant on the issues discussed, from the current foreclosure crisis to the uncertainty of Vancouver's future with regard to accessible public spaces." Maybe. But I am in a more assertive, if not entirely positive mood. "Linkages" is my favoured theme. Read the papers that follow and note how one thing invariably leads to another. The choice of which tone-mapping operator to use on remotely sensed imagery affects the clarity of the data presentation, and thus our understanding. First World demand for gold produces both opportunities for and exploitation of Peruvian producers. A "war on drugs,"

initiated by the USA, leads to environmental and social devastation in Colombia. In Metro Vancouver, a "war on crime" is also an assault on privacy, and a campaign against panhandling increases socio-spatial discrimination and undermines democracy. Decolonization leads to a quarter-century of conflict in Indonesia-occupied East Timor. Imagined geographies influence migration flows. And economic "stagflation" in the 1970s reshaped the American economy as it unravelled the Keynesian consensus, opened the door to neoliberalism and set the table for our current economic crisis.

To claim that everything is connected is to exaggerate, but there is no doubt that actions have consequences, and that these effects generally have spatial and social reverberations. This is in some sense the essence of geography, just as it is an important theme of almost all of the papers collected here. We understand ourselves and the places we inhabit better for knowing something of how we and they came into being. Moreover, such knowledge helps us in our efforts to navigate an uncertain future. And there is that word again. The editors were on to something all along. Read these diverse examples of geographical practice, learn from and think hard about the insights they offer, and acknowledge their value, as well as the effort, intelligence and good judgment necessary to bring them into being.

Dr. Graeme Wynn

Pictoral Tone Mapping Operators and Satellite Imagery: Some Initial Observations

Chris Adderley

Abstract: In this paper, high radiometric resolution imagery from the MODIS sensor on the Terra satellite was examined in order to explore the relevance of tone-mapping operators on remotely sensed imagery. Seven tone mapping operators were used, based on various algorithms originally intended to compress the high dynamic range in pictoral digital images. The interface Qtpfsgui was used to implement the operators on a band 256 composite of the MODIS data. Observation of the resulting images suggested that operators designed to take advantage of 32-bit depth as proposed by Ashikhmin (2002) and Fattal et al. (2002) were less useful than others considered. Of the remaining five, the Durand and Dorsay (2002), Reinhard et al. (2002), Reinhard and Devlin (2005) and Drago (2003) algorithms appeared to be the clearest. Further analysis is required to thoroughly examine these operators and determine whether any genuine advantage can be gained by compressing the dynamic range in this way.

nemote sensing - the capture and study of Limagery from afar – has seen significant growth in the past two decades. Data acquired from satellites and aircraft has become increasingly ubiquitous in geographic analysis and casual use, with high detail satellite mosaics being frequently displayed on television news programmes and the advent of popular internet mapping applications such as Google Earth. When discussing satellite imagery, remote sensing professionals consider four key image properties: spatial, spectral, temporal and radiometric resolutions. Spatial resolution refers to the smallest visible unit in a satellite image; it controls how much detail a user can see. Spectral resolution determines the area

of the electromagnetic spectrum that a sensor examines. Temporal resolution is simply how often a point on the globe can be revisited by a satellite; useful in land change analysis. This paper deals with the fourth type of resolution.

Radiometric resolution controls the number of levels of grey shown in an image. When it is at its lowest, one only sees two levels: black and white. Increasing the resolution (also known as the quantization level) allows more levels of grey to be defined. During satellite image capture, the amount of radiation that reaches the sensor is translated into a brightness value on the final image. If more levels of grey are available on the final image more detail is available to the image user. In a geographic context,

increasing radiometric resolution allows very fine details to be observed and increases the accuracy with which users can determine land cover. We define this property in terms of computer 'bits', which refer to the total number of different shades available per pixel in a digital image.

Current systems for the capture of remotely sensed data can quantify incoming radiation relatively finely. Observation and resource satellites have begun to evolve from the standard 8 bit per pixel model used since Landsat-4 in 1982 to higher resolutions (Aronoff 36). Quickbird and IKONOS, newer satellites launched in 2001 and 1999 respectively, can gather up to 11 bits of data (2048 values) per pixel. More spatially generalized sensors, such as the Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) on the Terra and Aqua satellites can record 12 bits of data (4096 values). At the upper end of the radiometric spectrum are radar satellites which can quantify 16 bit data (65 536 values). Trends would indicate that as sensors become more advanced we may see further increases in radiometric resolution.

Images captured using such sensors with more than 8 bits, or high dynamic range images, present a problem for users. Most video displays, such as projectors and LCD monitors can only handle 32 bits per pixel in four channels: red, green, blue, and alpha (transparency). Each of the channels can only display 8 bits, each with a luminance range from 0 to 255. This becomes problematic when dealing with 11-bit data which has values ranging from 0 to 2048. Inevitably, data will be lost when displaying it as a single channel, which requires that the data be resized to fit the 0-255 luminance range. Thankfully, the problem of displaying high dynamic range images has been addressed before, in the fields of digital photography and ocular physiology. Physical

light sources have long been known to contain more luminance values than a gradient of 0 to 255 can represent – the human eye uses an adaptive process to map the wide range of levels depending on its surroundings. An example of this is our sun: though we represent it in pictures as white or yellow-white, we inherently know that it is brighter than a white sheet of paper. Ocular sensitivity is automatically adjusted by the brain in response to the luminance of the observed object. Attempts to duplicate this mapping for images with a high dynamic range have been thoroughly explored by ocular physiologists and computer scientists. This research has resulted in a number of varying methods for the display of high dynamic range images on low dynamic range platforms and ultimately the technique known as tone mapping, now widely used to process a variety of pictoral high dynamic range digital images.

The initial purpose of these tone mapping operators was to imitate the human visual system and not for scientific applications. This limits the intended functionality to images taken in the visual range. Remote sensing operations expand this to include other areas of the electromagnetic spectrum such as infrared and microwave, and the effectiveness of the operators is not known for these applications. Such images are more difficult to validate against real world examples than pictorial imagery we cannot simply visually observe the original scene to determine operator accuracy as with photographs. In their 2007 paper, Park and Montag attempted to determine the usefulness of several tone mapping algorithms (which are designed to reduce the dynamic range to 0-255) in relation to scientific imagery in general (including three remotely sensed images) and concluded that they were effective, but limited their studies to relevance instead of analyz-

ing images in the context of their destination application. Seven different algorithms will be considered in this paper. Each handles high dynamic range data in a different manner, but these can be loosely divided into four categories (Reinhard et al., "High Dynamic Range Imaging" 27). The first category, global operators, apply filtering to the entire scene at once. Two algorithms proposed by Drago et al. (2003) and Reinhard et al. (2002) will be used to explore the global category. Local operators attempt to model the human visual system using known parameters and apply filters based on the area around a pixel. The approach used here is that proposed by Ashikhmin (2002), Mantiuk et al. (2006), as well as Reinhard and Devlin (2005). Frequency domain operators consider the frequencies of occurrence of various pixel values and apply a filter based on equalizing the categories from the high dynamic portion of the image's range. An example of this is Durand and Dorsey's (2002) bilateral filtering method. Gradient domain operators compress the gradient instead of the pixel values as suggested by Fattal et al. (2002). For more specific information see the Reference section to locate sources for the operators themselves.

Methods

To examine tone mapping operators, 12-bit MODIS images over central British Columbia were acquired. Six of the available spectral bands were used (Bands 2-7). Bands with coarser, 500 metre spatial resolution were resampled to standardized MODIS 250 metre resolution. Data values ranged from 0 to 7,000 depending on the band considered. To implement the algorithms, the graphical interface Qtpfsgui version 1.8.12 was used. The program is an open source implementation of various tone mapping operators including those discussed earlier, and was written by Guiseppe


Rota. Qtpfsgui was chosen due to its ease of use and ability to save settings files so as to assure uniformity across all images. The program also implements a wide range of operators from the four tone mapping domains. The images were firstly prepared for tone mapping by converting integer values in the original files to floating point values.

Two composites were then created using Adobe Photoshop CS2 for analysis in this study (ArcGIS lacks the ability to export to a 32-bit TIFF). Lack of Band 1 data (the visible red channel in the MODIS satellite sensor) precluded the creation of standard infrared, visible and near infrared composites, leaving only two geographically relevant composites possible far IR composites using in one instance bands 2 5 and 6 and the other using bands 2 4 and 5. The band 245 image was discarded due to data quality concerns. The seven tone mapping operators were then applied to the remaining band 256 image using Qtpfsgui. Various operator-specific settings available in the program were left at default values for all the images. The resulting images are displayed in Figures 1-3.

Results

There is a readily evident variance between the tone mapping operators discussed here. It is difficult to count any one image as superior, as most have some redeeming qualities, and we have no visual reference information as to what the scene "truly" looks like in the infrared band. However, some observations can be made of the apparent effects of the various operators on the scene.

The Drago and Reinhard 2002 results in Figure 1 both stem from global-type operators, and therefore should have a similar result. Comparisons show that they do - examination of the image histograms (not shown) reveals that similar values are present. On average, however, the Drago algorithm appears to make more use of highlights versus the darker Reinhard 2002 image. This is especially evident in Figure 1, where the Reinhard 2002 method provides a much darker image. Both images pick out groupings of highlights very well, though some ambiguity is present in the darker regions (mostly lakes in this case). There is some tonal bleeding from the surrounding pixels into the lakes, giving them a lighter colour than on the other images.




Reinhard 2002




Drago


Figure 1: Results of global tone mapping operators (Drago et al., Reinhard el al. 2002) on MODIS band 256 composite.



Mantiuk



Reinhard 2005



Ashikhmin

Figure 2: Results of local tone mapping operators (Reinhard and Devlin 2005, Ashikhmin, Mantiuk et al.) on MODIS band 256 composite.

Examining the Reinhard 2005, Ashikhmin,

and Mantiuk local operators (Figure 2), differences are very evident. The Ashikhmin image is unclear in the final composite, with blurring and poor use of the available colour space. This is likely because the Ashikhmin algorithm was designed for use with very high dynamic range images on the order of 32 bits with full utilization of all 4 million values (Ashikhmin 11), and may not be effective for the lower 12 bit range of these composites. It can therefore be rejected as a viable option for compressing the dynamic range of current generation satellite imagery. The Mantiuk operator also makes poor use of contrast. With the default settings used, the highlight sections of the HDR image are relatively unused, showing a dark image that would require further contrast enhancement for effective viewing. The 2005 Reinhard operator is similarly dark, establishing a general trend: the local operator category is not suitable for processing 12 bit imagery due to poor use of the final low dynamic range image. It should be noted however that with some brightness enhancements the Reinhard 2005 operator could be useful - though it is dark, one can easily pick out features, suggesting that it is effective at integrating the full dynamic range.


The Fattal composite (Figure 3) does not appear to be useful. It generates a surface that lacks definition but does make good use of the static range. It could be useful for the emphasis of small, high contrast features as narrow valleys and rivers are easily identified in the image. The Durand image (Figure 3) has similarly high luminance values but has more potential for applications; values in the lower area of the dynamic range are accentuated and displayed very effectively. Lakes, streams and shadowed mountain areas are particularly well defined even if the rest of the image is overexposed.

Conclusion

Most current methods of contrast enhancement in digital images are based uniquely on adjusting the image values themselves. Tone mapping, however, provides a method which uses additional data from datasets with a high dynamic range to enhance the contrast and luminance of scenes without resorting to the use of completely artificial values. As has been demonstrated in this paper, the variations produced by the various tone mapping algorithms are significant and can indeed enhance contrast or emphasize certain image features. It appears that pictoral local type operators, intent on replicating the human ocular system, do not effectively handle remotely sensed satellite images. Global operators such as those proposed by Drago (2003) and Reinhard et al. (2002) are more effective in displaying contrast, but still have problems with bright or dark areas. In opposition, the Durand operator is highly effective at displaying the tail ends of composites, but loses some effectiveness in middle ranges, tending towards overbrightening and oversaturation. Two of the algorithms produce results that are almost completely unsatisfactory - the Fattal and Askikhmin methods are designed



Fattal



Durand

Figure 3: Results of frequency and gradient domain tone mapping operators (Fattal et al., Durand and Dorsey) on MODIS band 256 composite.

for 32-bit images and are therefore not suitable for the limited dynamic range present in current remotely sensed images.

Satellite companies distributing scaled 11-bit data appear to in general use a simple linear stretching algorithm that is significantly more primitive than these advanced tone mapping algorithms (DigitalGlobe Inc.). This indicates that high radiometric resolution data is not being used to its maximum capabilities in the commercial industry. Though it is possible to acquire the higher resolution imagery, distribution of the 8-bit data continues. An increase of even one bit in radiometric resolution can render images stretched in this manner irrelevant. As satellite quantization level increases, additional resources will need to be devoted to finding a method for compressing the high dynamic range to a useful level - at least, until computer display and analysis routines can be improved sufficiently to handle it.

The next step in investigation of these tone mapping operators will be to refine these results. The promising operators are Durand (2002), Reinhard et al. (2002); Reinhard and Devlin (2005); Drago (2003), and should be further examined with a variety of image data types - higher spatial resolution would be ideal. This would allow remote sensing profes-

sionals to develop a better understanding of how changes in reflectance measured by the satellite sensor are handled by the pictoral tone mapping algorithms, and which is most suitable. I believe that suitability will depend heavily on application - tree crown measurement and species determination, for example, will benefit from increased definition in the shadow ranges. Similarly, very bright scenes may benefit from techniques that darken brighter areas while preserving contrast, allowing distinctions to be made. Operator-specific parameters, a very powerful tool not covered in this paper, should then be examined to determine what kind of enhancements can be made to the tone mapped imagery. Eventually, it may be possible to create a set of parameters specific to remote sensing applications that will allow the creation of tone mapping operators destined for nonpictoral imagery.

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Guiseppe Rota for writing the Qtpfsgui program, Patrick Collins for providing details on the DigitalGlobe linear stretching and Christopher Bater for allowing me access to the unfiltered raw MODIS data.

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Stagflation Shines on the Sunbelt: An Industry Analysis of Deindustrialization and the Growth of the Service Sector

Elissa Berrill

Abstract: The current economic crisis (2008-09) is threatening to cripple US automobile production, jeopardizing the last major manufacturing industry in North America. Current economic decisions made by the US government with respect to industry bailouts are more completely understood by analysing the period of stagflation experienced in the USA between 1973 and 1982. Using industrial sector employment data from the US Department of Labour, I conduct a shift-share analysis on two case study cities, Youngstown, Ohio and Dallas, Texas, to emphasize how geographical location and economic specialization led to the growth of the service industry in the South at the expense of the manufacturing belt region in the north-eastern USA since the 1970s. Interpreting the effects of this economic shift provides a glance into past US economic change, through which the economic values of the current US government can be better understood.

The United States experienced a period of ▲ stagflation between 1973 and 1982. Stagflation is defined as a period of increased unemployment and slow growth or economic stagnation, accompanied by rising prices or inflation (Investopedia). This economic crisis resulted in a massive change in the dominant economic sector of the US as manufacturing employment decreased, while service sector employment grew significantly (Knox & McCarthy). According to Paul Knox and Linda McCarthy (2005), the economic shift from manufacturing to services was a result of increased productivity and specialization in manufacturing, which increased demand for distribution and producer services, while decreasing employment opportunities in the

traditional manufacturing sector. Tickell and Peck (1992) present a less positive image, stating that manufacturing collapsed in the stagflation crisis because of external factors such as rising oil prices. However they also cite important internal factors, particularly worker 'militancy', technological stagnation, and a saturation of goods in consumer markets. Changes in employment were accompanied by changes in the geographic concentration of economic growth. While industrial development had been concentrated in the Manufacturing Belt of the Northeast, the service sector developed in the Sunbelt region of the South (Knox & McCarthy and Marshall & Wood; see [Figure 1] and [Figure 2]). This paper discusses the impacts of deindustrialization of the Man-

ufacturing Belt region and explains how the decentralization of the manufacturing industry in the US spurred the explosive growth of the service sector in the Sunbelt region. A shift-share analysis, which examines the combined effects of regional economic attractiveness and the region's industry make-up, will be executed upon industry employment data from Youngstown, Ohio and Dallas, Texas to help illustrate the changing economic patterns experienced in the USA during the 1970s stagflation crisis. Such an analysis will aid in our understanding of the benefits and consequences of this movement from industrial to advanced capitalism. This knowledge can then be used to help understand the values of the US government, in light of the current economic crisis (2008-09), and explain why the future of the North American automobile, the last major manufacturing sector of the USA, is so uncer-

1.0 Deindustrialization in the USA

From the eighteenth-century beginnings of the Industrial Revolution to the early 1970s,

the US economy was dominated by an economic system of export manufacturing (Knox & McCarthy). Industrialization centred on goods such as textiles and automobiles occurred throughout the Northeast region of the US in port cities such as Detroit, Chicago, New York and Youngstown. These cities were tied together by major waterways including the Great Lakes and the Ohio, Mississippi, and Missouri Rivers. The inter-relationships of these cities were cemented through the vertical and horizontal integration of machine production and the high wages and incomes offered to labourers. This resulted in the creation of a "robust, diversified producer and consumer durables sector" in the region widely known as the manufacturing belt (Markusen & Carlson, p. 31; see [Figure 1]). However, this concentration of labour and resources resulted in a lack of economic diversity, contributing to the severe unemployment in these regions, especially cities that specialized as manufacturing centres when the economy shifted in favour of the service sector, in the 1970s (Knox & McCarthy).




Figure 1: Manufacturing Belt at its Height (www.harpercollege.edu) 2.0

The Youngstown Case Study

Youngstown, Ohio [Figure 3] has become symbolic of deindustrialization, experiencing a loss of 10,000 jobs overnight when the Campbell Steel Works closed in 1977 (Knox & McCarthy). Through an exploration of the changes in Youngstown and the surround-

ing region's employment from 1973-1982, an image emerges of the impact deindustrialization had on the Manufacturing Belt's economic prosperity. While total employment in the US grew 16.38% during this period, the Youngstown regional employment declined by 10.41% over the same time (see Table 1).

	USA			Youngstown-Warren- Boardman		
	1973	1982	% change	1973	1982	% change
Farming	3,896,000	3,657,000	-6.13	3,747	4,327	15.48
Agricultural services, forestry, fishing & other	612,500	953,900	55.74	771	887	15.05
Mining	761,800	1,509,000	98.08	515	1,834	256.12
Construction	5,074,300	5,354,300	5.52	12,017	9,743	-18.92
Manufacturing	20,413,200	19,269,900	-5.60	111,491	66,462	-40.39
Transportation and public utilities	5,072,700	5,649,800	11.38	15,573	11,986	-23.03
Wholesale trade	4,529,200	5,722,500	26.35	9,093	10,776	18.51
Retail trade	15,012,100	18,169,100	21.03	48,388	50,360	4.08
Finance, insurance, and real estate	7,138,300	8,873,300	24.31	13,738	14,555	5.95
Services	19,192,400	26,834,500	39.82	50,876	63,079	23.99
Federal and civilian government	2,839,000	2,873,000	1.20	2,446	2,219	-9.28
Military	2,766,000	2,611,000	-5.60	2,381	2,399	0.76
State and local						
Government	11,125,000	13,080,000	17.57	25,088	26,663	6.28
Total full-time and part-time employment	98,432,500	114,557,300	16.38	296,124	265,290	-10.41

Table 1: Total Employment by Industrial sector, Youngstown-Warren-Boardman Region and USA 1973-1982 (U.S. Department of Labour, Division of Occupational Employment Statistics. "Full and Part-Time Employment by Standard Industrial Sector (SIC)." 1969-2000.)

Manufacturing employment in Youngstown plummeted by 40.39%, while the national decline was only 5.6%. Had Youngstown's total employment grown at the national rate, this would have increased to 344,634 jobs. Instead, the total employment declined, resulting in a deficit of 79,344 jobs. Applying a shift-share analysis to Youngstown (see Table 2), the gap between national and regional employment effects is confirmed. Additionally, the mix

industrial make-up, only 11,141 jobs - 14% of all those lost – were determined by Youngstown's industrial specialization.

The local growth effect clearly highlights a regional economic disparity within the Manufacturing Belt in relation to national performance. The local growth effect for Youngstown during this decade resulted in a loss of 68,203 jobs. This means that 86% of the total job loss in the Youngstown region was based on regional

	Mix Effect	Local Growth Effect	Combined Effects
Farming	-844	810	-34
Agricultural services, forestry, fishing & other	303	-314	-10
Mining	421	814	1,235
Construction	-1,305	-2,937	-4,243
Manufacturing	-24,508	-38,785	-63,293
Transportation and public utilities	-779	-5,359	-6,138
Wholesale trade	906	-713	193
Retail trade	2,249	-8,204	-5,955
Finance, insurance, and real estate	1,089	-2,522	-1,434
Services	11,924	-8,055	3,869
Federal and civilian government	-371	-256	-628
Military	-523	151	-372
State and local government	299	-2,834	-2,535
Totals	-11,141	-68,203	-79,344

Table 2: Shift-Share Analysis for Youngstown Region (U.S. Department of Labour, Division of Occupational Employment Statistics. "Full and Part-Time Employment by Standard Industrial Sector (SIC)." 1969-2000.)

effect measures how well the share or mix of employment in the region has performed in comparison with national industry averages. While job losses occurred due to Youngstown's

factors which caused jobs to shift away from the centre. These factors, such as high energy costs, foreign competition, employee dissatisfaction, and aging inefficient infrastructure, were compounded by inflation and a weakened economy.

4.0 The Sunbelt Region and the Growth of the Service Sector

In contrast, the Sunbelt region of the USA [Figure 2] promised cheaper land, lower taxes, lower energy costs, and cheaper, non-unionized labourers (Knox & McCarthy). As a result, the initial response of many industries to the manufacturing crisis and the increasingly obvious geographic economic disparity was to relocate or close plants, or lay-off workers in favour of

works between regions and sub-regions in the southern USA. Office-based services were the initial area of major service growth in the South. They are central to metropolitan development, having direct and indirect multiplier effects on the growth of the service industry. The direct effect of increased office development was increased employment in the Sunbelt region. There were also substantial indirect effects due to the extra purchasing power of upper and middle class employees stimulating the growth of consumer, leisure, and recreational services, as well as having larger national and




Figure 2: Sunbelt Region (www.city-data.com)

'greener pastures' (Knox & McCarthy).

The net movement of manufacturing to the Sunbelt region helped spur the explosion of the US service sector in the South, in the 1970s and 1980s. This is because increases in manufacturing led to an increased need for distribution and producer services (Knox & McCarthy). Many centres in the region such as Houston, the Santa Clara Valley (Silicon Valley), Atlanta, and Dallas were primed for economic growth due to the recent construction of the interstate highway system and the growth of airport net-

international effects on the tourism industry (Marshall & Wood).

5.0 The Dallas, Texas Case Study

The economy of Dallas, Texas (see [Figure 3]) helps to illustrate the growth of the service sector in the Sunbelt. Dallas has been an important financial centre since the turn of the twentieth century, establishing itself as a market centre for the state's cotton production early on, then quickly moving to oil as the industry grew in East Texas. The wealth

gained from the oil industry began to attract smaller corporate technological manufacturers in metropolitan areas (Hanson). The first corporate headquarters relocated to Dallas from the Northeast in 1948. There were more than 626 national company headquarters in Dallas including Texas Instruments in 1974, the same year the Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport opened (Dallas Historical Society). With a growing base of office service jobs and the international airport, Dallas was a prime target for manufacturing relocation and exemplified the value gained through the indirect multiplier effects of the service industry.

	USA			Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington		
	1973	1982	% change	1973	1982	% change
Farming	3,896,000	3,657,000	-6.13	17,194	19,994	16.28
Agricultural services, forestry, fishing & other	612,500	953,900	55.74	5,725	9,460	65.24
Mining	761,800	1,509,000	98.08	15,337	55,366	261.00
Construction	5,074,300	5,354,300	5.52	77,813	114,594	47.27
Manufacturing	20,413,200	19,269,900	-5.60	255,013	327,762	28.53
Transportation and public utilities	5,072,700	5,649,800	11.38	79,603	108,335	36.09
Wholesale trade	4,529,200	5,722,500	26.35	98,944	144,849	46.39
Retail trade	15,012,100	18,169,100	21.03	218,413	321,538	47.22
Finance, insurance, and real estate	7,138,300	8,873,300	24.31	129,741	187,820	44.77
Services	19,192,400	26,834,500	39.82	268,106	428,380	59.78
Federal and civilian government	2,839,000	2,873,000	1.20	28,589	32,939	15.22
Military	2,766,000	2,611,000	-5.60	16,209	16,789	3.58
State and local government	11,125,000	13,080,000	17.57	116,042	153,581	32.35
Total full-time and part-time employment	98,432,500	114,557,300	16.38	1,326,729	1,921,407	44.82

Table 3: Total Employment by Industrial Sector, Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington Region and the USA, 1973-1982. (U.S. Department of Labour, Division of Occupational Employment Statistics. "Full and Part-Time Employment by Standard Industrial Sector (SIC)." 1969-2000.)

Table 3 indicates a drastic difference in regional growth patterns in Dallas in comparison with Youngstown. Regional growth for Dallas and its surrounding region over this period was 44.82%, nearly three times the growth of the country as a whole. Manufacturing employment growth at 28.53% affirms the movement of manufacturing into the Sunbelt region, while service sector employment increased nearly 60% (Table 3). Had Dallas' employment grown at the national rate, total employment would have increased from 1,326,729 to 1,544,068. Instead, employment boomed to 1,921,407, which resulted in a growth

surplus of 377,339 jobs. The shift-share analysis for the Dallas Metropolitan Area (Table 4) shows that the region did gain employment in the form of 29,023 jobs from the industry mix, which it specialized in relative to the national equivalent. However, the vast majority of the job surplus Dallas experienced during this period was due to the local attractiveness of Dallas, along with the entire Sunbelt region. While Dallas is much larger than Youngstown, the proportional difference in employment changes between the two regions during the 1970s was staggering.

	Mix effect	Local Growth Effect	Combined Effects
Farming	-3,871	3,855	-17
Agricultural services, forestry, fishing & other	2,253	544	2,797
Mining	12,531	24,986	37,517
Construction	-8,453	32,487	24,034
Manufacturing	-56,058	87,032	30,974
Transportation and public utilities	-3,984	19,676	15,692
Wholesale trade	9,860	19,836	29,696
Retail trade	10,152	57,193	67,345
Finance, insurance, and real estate	10,281	26,545	36,825
Services	62,835	53,519	116,354
Federal and civilian government	-4,341	4,008	-333
Military	-3,564	1,488	-2,075
State and local government	1,383	17,147	18,529
Totals	29,023	348,316	377,339

Table 4: Shift-Share Analysis for the Dallas Region: Employment Changes, 1973-1982 (U.S. Department of Labour, Division of Occupational Employment Statistics. "Full and Part-Time Employment by Standard Industrial Sector (SIC)." 1969-2000.)

6.0 Implications and Repercussions of Deindustrialization and Decentralization

While the direct economic impacts of deindustrialization and job shift are readily apparent, there are also indirect costs associated with decline. Job losses in the manufacturing sector affect supplementary industrial sectors, which can in turn lead to a decline in retail and personal services jobs (Knox & McCarthy). While Dallas experienced a boom in home and commercial development, extending employment into the trades sector during the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, Youngstown showed a large decrease in construction employment during the period, an ancillary industrial sector (Hanson). Similarly, Dallas' employment in the finance, insurance, and real-estate sector increased nearly 45%, and retail trade increased 47% from 1973-82, reflecting an increase in consumer wealth. The same sectors in Youngstown grew only 6% and 4% respectively over the same period.

Manufacturing relocation decisions also hold indirect costs for local labourers and have important local implications on public funding. The location of a plant affects government budgets for initiatives such as highway construction and changes in federal tax revenues. When a plant relocates less funding is available to address social issues in industrially abandoned areas, while areas of relocation enjoy increases in local and federal government funding (Persky & Wiewel). These trends are reflected in both case study cities as Youngstown's federal and civilian employment decreased 9.28%, while Dallas' increased 15.22%. Any desires by planners and policymakers to reallocate funding to those areas in need are deterred by the threat of lost funding (Rast). This has perpetuated the patterns of income disparity and increased poverty in deindustrialized

regions. The US Department of Housing and Urban Development measured levels of urban distress across the US in 1982 at the end of the stagflation period, in order to determine regional federal aid eligibility (Knox & McCarthy; [Figure 3]). This measure was based upon a set of minimum standards relating to population growth, levels of household income, and employment in the manufacturing and retail industry. It also included maximum standards with respect to poverty levels, age of residential infrastructure, and unemployment. An index score of six was assigned to all cities of over 100,000 residents to address levels of distress: the higher the number, the more distressed the area. The Dallas area ranked between (-1) to 1 showing low distress, while many of the cities along Lake Erie within the Manufacturing Belt, including Youngstown, were ranked between 5 to 6, the highest levels of distress (Knox & McCarthy).




Figure 3: US Housing and Urban Development Measure of Urban Distress, 1982 (Knox and McCarthy, p. 86)

7.0 Conclusion

The decade of stagflation from 1973-1982, created more than a temporary economic crisis in

the US. It changed the entire economic makeup of the country, both industrially and geographically. It is important to acknowledge the continued presence of manufacturing as a source of employment and revenues within the US. Simultaneously, it is equally important to realize it is an industry that has been in decline since the 1970s, as cheap labour and rents continue to be the driving force behind manufacturing production in an increasingly global world*. Markusen and Schrock (2008) recently attempted to redefine the economy of America within urban systems theory by incorporating consumption activities and the role of the service industry. They argue that it is not only manufacturing export activities that define regional growth; goods and services production and consumption can also be a source of regional job growth and stability.

The current economic crisis is threatening a major part of what is left of the manufacturing sector in the US "Rust Belt" – the automobile industry. High legacy costs coupled with large surplus capacity are threatening to fatally cripple America's car manufacturing companies. While Ford Motor Company appears surviving for now, General Motors Corporation (GM) and Chrysler Corporation are facing imminent bankruptcy. GM "claims that 80% of its customers would not buy a car from a bankrupt firm" due to issues of car warranties and part sup-

plies and therefore bankruptcy is not an option (Economist, 2008). The company is searching for an infusion of cash from the US government, but the future does not look promising.

The hesitation on the part of the US government to bail out key players in the North American auto industry conveys an unmistakable statement regarding the priorities of the US government in attempting to recover the current economy. This political sentiment is a clear reflection of the economic and geographic shift to the service industry that began during the 1970s and its continued presence and dominance in the global economy today. It seems clear that future economic decisions have been and will continue to be based around managing a service, rather than a manufacturing, economy.

*For more information on the socio-economic and socio-political effects of deindustrialization and the rise of neoliberalism on race, class, and gender see: David Harvey (2005). A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press and Naomi Kline (2007). The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. Toronto: A.A. Knoft Canada. For more information of the suburbanization of the manufacturing industry see Persky and Wiewel (2000),

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A Critique of Project Civil City's Initiative to Implement CCTV in Vancouver

William Dunn

Abstract: On 27 October, 2008, nearly two years after former Mayor Sam Sullivan and the City of Vancouver's Project Civil City proposal, the government of British Columbia gave the go ahead to fund a \$1 million project to install closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras in high-crime areas of Vancouver and Surrey. Despite claims that CCTV has a "powerful crime-fighting impact," research suggests that CCTV cameras are not effective in reducing crime. They displace crime to other areas, threaten the peoples' right to privacy, and create exclusive spaces within the city.

"They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety"

- Ben Franklin, 1775

In November 2006, the City of Vancouver's Project Civil City was introduced as a response from Sam Sullivan, Vancouver's mayor at the time, to growing concerns about street disorder in the community (City of Vancouver). Within the report, there was a plan to introduce closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras to, "deter public disorder and support [our] police in the capturing of individuals breaking the law" (City of Vancouver 11). On October 27, 2008, (nearly two years after the proposal), the government of British Columbia government decided to go ahead and fund a \$1 million project to install CCTV cameras in high-crime areas of Vancouver and Surrey, while expand-

ing their pre-existing coverage in Kelowna (Mertl). Sam Sullivan has stated that CCTV cameras can "have a powerful crime-fighting impact;" unfortunately, there is no evidence to support this claim. Most of the time, crime is merely displaced to areas beyond the cameras (Vancouver Sun). Moreover, CCTV coverage creates exclusive spaces, protects gentrified areas from people who don't "belong" socially and economically, raises privacy concerns, and plays on the public's perceptions of fear. For these reasons, the initiative to introduce CCTV should have been dismissed, and should not have been included in Project Civil City.

The primary concern with CCTV cameras is that they geographically displace crime (Mertl). For example, in Doncaster, UK, CCTV cameras pushed crime away from the town centre to peripheral areas. The result was that the overall reduction in crime was minimal, even though a decline occurred in neighbourhoods with

CCTV coverage (Skinns). Consequently, the displacement of crime is now being combated in places like Newcastle, UK, where CCTV had previously been heralded as a major success (Millward). They have been forced to add more, cameras that will continue to cover increasingly wider areas (Millward). Once CCTV systems are installed, they beg for expansion. Communities and businesses that occupy unmonitored spaces will lobby for CCTV coverage to avoid having crime displaced into their areas (Graham). Economies of scale are also at work; once a CCTV system is built and monitoring personnel are employed, it makes economic sense to cover larger and larger areas at increasingly reduced costs (Graham). Additionally, Murray Mollard, executive of the BC Civil Liberties Association, is concerned with what he calls "function creep," when a technology is implemented for one purpose then used for another (Gibson). New uses are constantly being created for CCTV that go beyond their initial purpose. For example, cameras that are installed to prevent crime are used to prevent terrorism, observe traffic, monitor graffiti, and even check the performance of street cleaners (Graham). In sum, while the public may only be interested in having CCTV coverage in Vancouver's worst crime areas, displacement of crime, and function creep will facilitate the further expansion of CCTV.

An expansive network of CCTV cameras is especially worrisome because cameras can be programmed to automatically scan for things like specific faces or car license plates (Graham). This means CCTV systems can operate as a social ordering strategy (Coleman, Sim). They can exclude individuals from certain spaces, ensuring that they stay where they belong (Graham). There is evidence of this in the increasingly commercialized and privately-managed consumption spaces of Brit-

ish city-centres. There, people who are not seen as economically beneficial to these commercial spaces don't "belong," and experience especially close scrutiny (Graham). A consequence of this is that an unprecedented amount of authority is given to CCTV operators and those in power, who get to stipulate who belongs (Graham). If CCTV is installed in Vancouver, it will allow the same treatment as in Britain for people who don't "belong". These people may be excluded from the entertainment district, or premium commercial spaces, for many reasons, whether it's their appearance, their habits, or their challenging of the normative concepts of who belongs where within the city (Graham).

Because CCTV increases the ability to expel individuals, it can be a complementary tool for gentrification. People who don't fit the model of the residential property-owner, shopper, or tourist, in neighbourhoods like Yaletown or Gastown will simply be pushed into neighbourhoods that aren't under CCTV coverage (CCAP). These will likely be neighbourhoods that nobody cares to protect, or areas outside the city. The reason this may occur is because, in today's age, cities like Vancouver are packaged and sold like commodities. Events like the 2010 Winter Olympics are an ideal mechanism by which a city can brand, publicize, and promote themselves to the global community (McCallum, Spencer, Wyly). Accordingly, it can be understood how Vancouver's new image the one portrayed to the Olympic committee - needs to be protected by the watchful eye of CCTV cameras, to keep downtown gentrified neighbourhoods free of the city's marginalized people. What is more, even the citizens who do "belong" will be videotaped, regardless of whether or not they are being scrutinized.

On March 27, 2007, a Project Civil City "Progress Report" was released. Under the heading "Leg or Policy Changes Req'd/Challenges"

for CCTV, it says there is "opposition" to this "type of program by both the Provincial and Federal Privacy Commissioners" and that "[w] ork needs to be done to garner their approval" (City of Vancouver 25-26). In that endeavour, they have stated that the government will work with BC information and Privacy Commissioner David Loukidelis, to establish rules for collecting, managing, and protecting information obtained from cameras (Mertl). CCTV advocates appear to be fully aware of the human rights and privacy issues involved with video taping their citizens, but rather than discussing these issues with the public, and reaching a consensus on whether or not people want to be videotaped, they simply regard these issues as something to get past.

B.C. Attorney General Wally Oppal has admitted that the government is aware of privacy concerns, but feels these worries should be negated by CCTV's crime-reducing capabilities, and the fact that the cameras will give citizens a "psychological boost," making them feel safer in public (Mertl). Unfortunately, studies have shown that even though CCTV cameras create an initial deterrent effect during the first and second months after implementation (Mazerolle, Hurley, Chamlin), there is no conclusive evidence that they actually reduce crime (Mertl). Likewise, a study done in the UK - where thousands of CCTV cameras record public spaces – found that the presence of cameras had no significant impact on the crime rate (Gibson). The report, "Home Office Research Study 292: Assessing the impact of CCTV," found that the majority of systems did not reduce crime, and when a reduction was seen, it was usually not due to CCTV (Gibson). Also, contrary to Oppal's alleged "psychological boost," CCTV schemes did not make people feel safer, or change their behaviour (Gibson). This is because the public's fear exists regardless of environment (Davis). In addition, the reassurance of living under the watchful eye of CCTV can actually be neutralized by the technology's constant reminder that a threat is continuously lurking.

Thankfully, the evidence acquired from the UK's extensive experiment with CCTV has swayed some cities into saying no to CCTV (Graham, Brooks, Heery). In Oakland, California, police rejected a CCTV proposal, understanding the fact that there is no conclusive way to establish whether CCTV cameras prevent or reduce crime (ACLU). They acknowledge how we should not be too surprised if technology fails to fix the complex social problems in our neighbourhoods (Kendall). On top of this, when a program like CCTV is applied in tandem with a number of other crime reducing initiatives, like those in Project Civil City, it becomes impossible to determine which initiative (including CCTV) is actually having an effect on the crime-rate, and to what degree. Contrary to this overwhelming evidence, Vancouver Police Chief Jamie Graham has pointed out that CCTV was crucial in identifying and capturing terrorist bombers in London and Madrid, suggesting that with the 2010 Olympics approaching, it might be important to forget about all of CCTV's problems for the time being (Gibson). Yet, one must note that even though CCTV cameras were vital in the apprehension of terrorists in the London and Madrid bombings, they failed to actually prevent the attacks.

There has been little public debate on whether or not Vancouver's residents want to be videotaped on a daily basis, and there is convincing evidence indicating that CCTV cameras do not decrease crime rates. Although the cameras will be effective in deterring crime in one area, the crime will be displaced to another. Given this evidence, as well as CCTV's potential to

facilitate social exclusion in certain spaces, it is dangerous to implement CCTV anywhere. Curiously, even though the debate in the media has centred on the ineffectiveness of CCTV as a crime-reduction tool, when returning to the Project Civil City report, it only says that it will "deter public disorder" (City of Vancouver 26). It does not say anywhere that CCTV is actually meant to reduce crime or the public's fear of it. That being said, their goal of deterring public disorder can be done by simply displacing

crime away from targeted areas. This makes one wonder if CCTV is knowingly being implemented as a displacement tool rather than as a crime-reduction tool. With the 2010 Olympics approaching, and Vancouver increasingly being subjected to international scrutiny, this is not far-fetched. CCTV may simply be one of many initiatives in Project Civil City designed to keep parts of Vancouver free from those who don't "belong".

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Fumigating the 'Pest': Plan Colombia and the Failed War on Drugs

Peter Hartwick, Stephanie Rankine & Carla Sullivan

Abstract: Plan Colombia was initially established as a two-year Colombian governmental program developed to strengthen the state and economy of Colombia, secure peace, and restore civil society by controlling the cultivation and expansion of illegal crops and trafficking. A concentrated version of "Round-Up Ultra" was used to fumigate supposed 'industrial size' coca fields. This chemical herbicide is problematic: it penetrates deep into the waxy leaf structure of the coca plant; it adheres to human skin, which causes many health issues; it degrades the environment; it causes forced displacement, and thus destroys development projects set out to move peasants toward legal economic alternatives. This analysis of the war on drugs, as a form of US imperialism under the guise of 'development', will argue that Plan Colombia has, on many levels, caused on-going environmental and social devastation. This paper focuses especially the aerial fumigation of coca in the department of Putumayo.

"Take up the White Man's burden -The savage wars of peace -Fill full the mouth of Famine
And bid the sickness cease;
And when your goal is nearest
The end for others sought,
Watch Sloth and heathen Folly
Bring all your hope to nought."

- Rudyard Kipling

Introduction

At the end of the Second World War, U.S. President Truman, in his inaugural address to the nation, redefined colonialism in terms of the promotion of democracy. To Truman, healing the post-war world of its ails

required 'the West' to bring 'development' to 'underdeveloped countries'. Truman's vision of 'development' thus sowed the seeds for a new (American) colonialism, a neo-colonialism. This notion of development established a hegemonic "role for the US within the newly independent countries that were emerging from a process of decolonization" (Escobar 19). Since then, U.S. imperialism has (and very much continues to) reproduced the treacherous impacts in Latin America which many thought rested only in the past – all in the name of development. Ideologically, American imperialism seeks to strengthen protection of the homeland. In practice, protection has materialized in many forms, a persistent theme being intervening in other countries.

A significant manifestation of homeland protection is the current war on drugs in the U.S. Each year illegal drug use kills some 52,000 Americans and "the costs of health care, accidents, and lost productivity reach \$110 billion" (Marcella 4), leading to a declaration by the U.S. that narcotics have become a "lethal threat to America's national security" (Tickner 77). The use of narcotics in the U.S. has had great social and economic costs, reaching far beyond that nation's borders. In theory, the war on drugs is a campaign carried out by the U.S. government intended to reduce the illegal drug trade, to curb supply, and diminish demand. In practice, it is a war occurring largely outside America's borders, where many have been killed, hundreds of thousands have been displaced, and very little has been resolved.

In 1998, U.S. foreign policy took a decisive turn when Andres Pastrana assumed the presidency in Colombia and began eradicating the growth and production of coca. In 1999, President Pastrana met with President Clinton to secure \$1.7 billion in U.S. development aid to tackle the war on drugs in a scheme called "Plan Colombia". This established Colombia as the third-largest recipient of US aid in the world, after Israel and Egypt (Chomsky). Of this proposed aid, \$1 billion would go toward strengthening the Colombian military's ability to stem coca planting and retake guerrilla-held coca-areas. The other \$700 million would support coca substitution programs, infrastructure in sensitive regions, and improvements in Colombia's judicial system and human rights protections (Pardo 65).

1.0 Brief background to the conflict and Plan Colombia

In 2001, it was estimated that close to 30,000 acres of land in Colombia, concentrated in the south-western department of Putumayo, was

being used for the cultivation of coca. Annually, Colombia produces approximately 520 metric tons of cocaine for export (Marcella 2). According to Chomsky, peasants in Colombia grow coca instead of other crops "because of the crisis in the agricultural sector of Latin American countries, escalated by the general economic crisis in the region" (Chomsky 74). Pressure on the peasantry mounted as ranchers, investors, and legal commercial farmers created and strengthened private armies (the paramilitaries), who brutally seized land from indigenous peoples and peasants. Consequently, traffickers acquired control over vast swaths of Colombia's valuable land.

To counter this trend, Plan Columbia sought to expand the counternarcotics operations in Southern Colombia. One main element of the U.S. aid package is the aerial fumigation of coca fields (Marcella 8, Isaacson 8). The main target for fumigation, the province of Putumayo, quickly became known as "ground zero", due to its enormous cultivation of cocaine and heroin for export, and violence associated with those activities. According to the U.S. Congress, only zones of "industrial" coca-growing "with large plantations run by distant drug lords" would be targeted (Isaacson 10). As such, the aid package allocates zero humanitarian aid or alternative development assistance to anyone in the "industrial" zone.

It was learned after mass fumigations, which left hundreds of thousands displaced, that the "industrial" zone actually comprises small parcels of individually owned land (Isaacson 11). Chomsky accurately summarizes this in his Colombia chapter of Rogue States. He argues that both the counterinsurgency battalions and the fumigations target the most socially fragile link the in drug chain – peasants and indigenous people – rather than attacking traffickers. These measures increase the dangers

to civilian populations, the environment, and legal agriculture (including water sources and livestock).

2.0 Fumigation and the Environment

The fumigation of coca plants under the Plan Colombia regime began on 19 December 2000. The chemical herbicide used is a concentrated version of "Round-Up Ultra" (Isacson 3, 8-9). Not only does this defoliant penetrate the waxy leaf structure of the coca plant, it also adheres to human skin (Delamater 121). Glyphosate, an ingredient of Round-Up, is supposed to break down within a few days of application. However, due to the presence of other active ingredients and the high amount of herbicide needed per hectare in order to achieve a sufficient 'real kill percentage', negative secondary effects in human beings and surrounding plant life are commonly experienced (Jelsma 2-5). Labels on "Round-Up Ultra" sold in the United States warn users to "avoid direct application to any body of water" and explicitly state "do not apply this product in a way that will contact workers or other persons, either directly or through drift and only protected handlers may be in the area during application" (Eichbaum 1). What is truly alarming is the denial, on behalf of both governments, that glyphosate has any negative effects on human, plant, and/ or animal life and will not harm the environment.

Furthermore, glyphosate is not being administered according to the specified directions, nor are proper precautions being taken to avoid the negative impacts it might have on all forms of life. "Round-Up Ultra" is sprayed from planes at great distances from the ground, leading to highest amount of drift possible and causing this herbicide to be found up to 800 meters from its target (Nivia). The chemical purposely clings to and eradicates plants, including the

basic food crops (yucca, avocado, maize, plantains) of nearby subsistence farmers (Tickner 79, Cooper 11, Delamater 121-2).

As a consequence of fumigating coca fields, indigenous crops, like the Cananguchal Palm trees and yagé, have been destroyed. The loss of such sacred crops and palm oases has reduced the range of both domestic and wild animals, with adverse affects on the indigenous people of this area. As the Guamués Valley and other areas of the Putumayo department are increasingly invaded by colonos or illegal squatters who grow significant amounts of coca, fumigation planes are attracted, carry out the spraying of glyphosate, drying out and destroying entire ecosystems, eventually leaving the surrounding vegetation and animals, which depend on it, to perish, and traditions to slowly fade away (Jelsma 5-6).

In addition to environmental degradation, direct contact with and/or inhalation of the pesticide used to fumigate coca farms has caused many health problems. There have been numerous complaints from Colombian people in fumigated areas that spraying has sharply increased cases of skin rashes and outbreaks, dizziness, nausea, gastrointestinal disorders like vomiting and diarrhea, and respiratory ailments (Isacson 12, Tickner 78, Jelsma 6). However, such symptoms are considered 'scientifically impossible' by government officials because the studies carried out thus far only focus on glyphosate in isolation, as opposed to the composition currently used in fumigation. Despite these complaints from both indigenous adults and children, there has never been a medical field investigation or a systematic attempt to collect information from local physicians, hospitals or health authorities (Jelsma 6).

Development projects set out to move peasants toward legal economic alternatives have also been stymied as a result of coca fumigation. For example, a coca-paste lab that was turned into a chicken coop, as well as an aquaculture project in La Isla were destroyed by the persistent spraying. The ponds dried up, and the chickens and fish were dead within a few days (Isacson 11). When spraying is not accompanied by a credible alternative development effort, especially in the Putumayo area, and once such viable projects are decimated, thousands of peasants suddenly find themselves with their crops eradicated and no way to make a living, ultimately defeating the entire purpose of creating legal economic crop substitutions (Isacson 7).

Since the onset of fumigation, the situation in Colombia has not seen much improvement. Not only is spraying counterproductive, often causing an increase in coca production in many Colombian regions such as the Putumayo, but there are also reported health effects in the peasant populations, signs of faunal disruption and floral decimation. The environmental dangers of the fumigations do not stand in isolation, but are further reverberated into society. The question remains: how can communities survive and thus develop if the very foundations of life are degraded and destroyed due to fumigation?

3.0 Human Displacement

Fumigation has caused forced displacement in two major ways. First, the spraying of glyphosate does not distinguish between legal crops such as bananas, corn and yucca and the illegal coca. In most cases, the farmers who dedicate their lands to growing alternative crops lose everything when fumigations target them. For example, the municipal police investigated the fumigations in the Guamués Valley, which has a population of 4,289, in the Putumayo department (Craig-Best 1-13). The police found that as of February 2001, 17,912

acres had been fumigated with herbicides, but of this area, less than 12% actually contained coca cultivations (Mugge 9).

The second way that fumigation causes displacement is by the increases in conflict that coincide with aerial spraying. The majority of the fumigations have taken place in southern Colombia. These areas are also coincidently where Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) popularity and presence are the strongest (Mugge 5).

Under the current Plan Colombia, fumigation is to be used only in large industrial cultivation areas. However, in much of Southern Colombia the land is owned and cultivated by small campesinos or farmers, on plots of land less the 3 hectares (approximately the size of 4 football fields) (Mugge 5). Despite this fact, fumigation is still rampant in the south, while many plots in the North have been left alone. Many analysts believe that this is because the latter areas are under paramilitary control (Mugge 6).

Some of the anger towards the government stems from its failure to provide assistance to farmers who have lost their crops. This is best demonstrated in Putumayo, where in July 2001 nearly half of the department's population agreed to sign a social pact with the government (Isacson 7). This social pact promised to provide signatories with basic assistance to help them adopt legal alternatives to growing coca, followed by technical and infrastructure support in exchange for eradicating all their coca within twelve months (Isacson 7). The social pact concept gained the full support of peasant leaders, local authorities, and the governor of Putumayo, who all believed alternative development would help alleviate many of the department's problems (Mugge 9). However, by April 2002 only 8,500 families, less than one fifth, had received any form of assistance (Isacson 7). Consequently, the remaining families did not eradicate their coca crops because they had no other way to make a living. The U.S. and Government of Colombia concluded that because many of the families who agreed to eradicate their crops did not ultimately do so, the social pact strategy was not effective for eradication and alternative development (Mugge 9).

Approximately fifty-five percent of Colombia's population currently lives below the poverty level. Across the Andean Region, peasants turn to coca cultivation in response to the crisis in the agricultural sector. However, U.S. insistence upon fumigating the coca crop destroys the only crop many peasants and indigenous peoples can grow profitably (Mugge 3). In just the first two years since its implementation, Plan Colombia has caused the forced displacement of over 340,000 people (White 90). Once fumigated, these lands offer nothing for campesinos to work with and cause increased tensions between rebel, paramilitary and peasant factions. If the U.S. truly wants to help Colombia solve its security and coca problems, there should be more emphasis on social and economic assistance.

4.0 Criticisms, Conclusions and Alternatives

It has been widely accepted that the Plan Columbia has been a devastating failure and has not reduced coca production, trafficking, and consumption. Since the onset of aerial fumigation, coca's value, along with its production, has been skyrocketing, with a 25 per-

cent increase in the price of coca paste within the first three months of the inception of Plan Columbia (Isaacson 11, Vaicius 10).

If the goal is coca eradication, there are safer and more cost effective alternatives to chemical fumigation, such as manually extracting coca plants (Mugge 14). However, for this method to be effective, farmers need the support of the Colombian government or international aid, along with greater subsidies and a more structured social and economic infrastructure, along with assistance in the development of alternative crops.

Then there is the question of hypocrisy: how can a rich and powerful nation such as the U.S. legitimize "source country control" of illicit drugs when the demand exists on its own soil? Illegal drug use in the U.S. is at an all-time high; meanwhile, studies have consistently revealed that treatment and prevention are more effective than heavy-handed measures.

It is clear that Plan Colombia has been unsuccessful. This isn't solely a consequence of poor planning and inadequate decision making, but it is deeply rooted in a denial-bound ideology of the West and the rest, Us and Them. It is an affirmation of the not-so-outdated 'white man's burden', or rather, the burden from the white man which continues to prevail.

Acknowledgements

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Manufacturing Imagined Worlds: The construction of socio-cultural narratives and its influence on migration

Goh Iromoto

Abstract: In the past, international migration has primarily been examined from a political and economic perspective. Studies neglect to identify global movements as a multifaceted phenomenon in which cultural factors act as a primary force. However, some scholars have recognized these important facets of culture in which multiple sources, such as electronic media, have also persuaded the individual to migrate. This essay examines the underlying socio-cultural forces that assert and redefine the 'imaginative' construct of global reality, which as a result perpetuates migration. Several case studies outline the structures that surround the notion of the 'imagined world', particularly the 'imagined West', and how various modalities help formalize inaccurate desires and expectations through the scale of the individual and the nation. These case studies include migrants from Albania and Morocco, as well as wealthy Japanese youth – a group relatively removed from political and economic factors and therefore providing further evidence of cultural forces on migration. The essay also attempts to delve into the mechanisms behind the power structures, in the form of cultural hegemony and imperialism, between Western and non-Western cultures, and how they reshape and impact global migratory perceptions.

Over the past decades, scholars and journalists alike have critically examined the international migration of people from 'developing' countries to Western 'developed' countries – often only focusing on labour migrants and refugees studies (Fujita 23; Sabry 1). However, such migration theory often emphasized only the political and economic frameworks of migration-inducing factors, and neglected to identify global movements as a multifaceted phenomenon, in which cultural factors also act as a primary force. Some scholars, such as

Saskia Sassen (Fujita 24), have recognized these important facets of culture in which multiple sources, such as electronic media, have established significant roles in forming 'cultural ideological links' that ultimately result in persuading the individual to migrate. In this sense, this paper extends beyond conventional 'push' and 'pull' factors as the rationale behind migratory movements worldwide. Instead, it examines the underlying socio-cultural force that asserts and redefines the mythical and 'imaginative' construct of the global reality, which as

a result perpetuates migration. Such narratives are observed by anthropologist, Arjun Appadurai, who states how electronic media allow people to construct 'imagined worlds' in their everyday lives: under the influence of radio and television, cassettes and videos, newsprint and telephone, more people than ever before imagine the possibility that they will live and work in places other than where they were born (1996).

Several case studies outline the structures that surround the notion of the 'imagined world', particularly the 'imagined West', and how various modalities help formalize inaccurate desires and expectations through the scale of the individual and the nation. In all cases, these misconceptions of the West were so powerful that they assisted migratory aspirations. Nicola Mai examined the narratives of Albanian migrants during the 1990s that were heavily influenced by Italian satellite television. Sabry, also identified similar narratives within his case studies of Moroccan migrant culture, mostly affected by Western sub-standard, cheap television programming. And lastly, Yuiko Fujita further studied the relationship between electronic media and the 'imagined world' through an ethnographical study of wealthy Japanese youth aspiring to migrate to the United States and Europe, a group relatively removed from political and economic factors seen in the previous examples and therefore providing further evidence of the significant impact of cultural forces on migration. This paper also attempts to delve into the mechanisms behind the power structures, in the form of cultural hegemony and imperialism, between Western and non-Western cultures, and how they reshape and impact global migratory perceptions. From this approach, Western media is depicted as an agent of meaning and power across the globe. In this

manner, the concept of 'imagined worlds' fuels potential for further remaking and redefining our current global paradigm.

1.0 Mediascapes, Imagined Narratives and Migration

Ordinary people around the world are exposed to combinations of prints, images, electronic screens, and billboards in their everyday lives. The television, for example, is a significant source that remains as a consumer priority for most people, as well as the dominant framework for news, cultural forums, and discussions, in the developing world (Straubhaar 1). Appadurai (35) refers to this phenomenon as a 'mediascape' - the distribution of the electronic capabilities to produce and disseminate information (newspapers, magazines, television, film, etc.) and the images of the world created by these media. Mediascapes tend to be image-centered, narrative based accounts of reality, and offer a series of elements (such as characters, plots, and textual forms) out of which imagined lives "help to constitute the narratives of the Other and protonarratives of possible lives, [where] fantasies become prolegomena to the desire for acquisition and movement" (Appadurai 36).

Similar to mediascapes, Sarbin's (Sladkova 190) 'imaginings' are defined as "emplotted narratives carrying implications of causality and duration...fashioned from concurrent perceptions of proximal and distal stimulus events, from rememberings, cultural stories, legends, myths, ... and experiences." In both scenarios, audiences blur the lines between the realistic and fictional landscapes, and thus, are more likely to construct imagined worlds that are "chimerical, aesthetic, and even fantastic objects" (Appadurai 35). If this imagined world becomes powerful and persuasive

enough, then certain individuals project themselves into the role of migrants in a desired destination, hence, this imagining may lead to actual migration. Of course, others may be persuaded by alternative narratives of hardship,

of East-West mass migration in Europe induced by imaginary narratives (Mai 3). The Albanian migration flows, mainly to Greece and Italy, reflected a multidimensional phenomenon shaped by political, economic, and socio-cul-




Figure 1: Number of television receivers worldwide per 1,000 inhabitants, 1997 (Steven 102).

for instance, imagining themselves on a difficult life-risking journey, and decide to remain instead (Sladkova 191). In this context, the premigration stage evokes powerful cultural narratives from different mediascapes, whether real or not, which drive the motivational force for people to migrate or to stay. The following case studies further elaborate the relationship between mediascapes, imagined narratives, and migration.

2.0 Case study: Albania

Between 1991 and 1997 the exodus of desperate Albanian migrants fleeing economic and political instability depicted a major example tural changes and conditions that occurred within the country, in which migrants were described as being "encouraged by hopes of success, pushed by necessity, and by the imaginary world provided by television" (Mai and Schwander-Sievers 940; Mai 4). Thus, the consumption of Italian television was significantly involved in the emergence of 'migratory' lifetrajectories as a cultural ideological link, and consequently, in the actual migration of young Albanians to Italy.

Until 1990, Albanian national television consisted of only one channel, whose content was mostly filled with national propaganda and politicized documentaries, films, and

programmes (Mai and Schwander-Sievers, 6). Many of these television programmes, like national migration policies, were often contained and restricted within the Albanian border during this era. However, 97 per cent of the Albanian migrants in Italy in 1991 had watched Italian television through subversive means (homemade satellites), and 89 per cent of them had even learned Italian by watching these programs (Mai and Schwander-Sievers 7). Various interviews with young Albanians showed that they had consequently misconceived Italy as an imagined world, mostly lamented the search for something new and 'real' and found in Italian television, beauty, entertainment, and abundance:

"I didn't like anything about Albanian TV, whereas in Italy programmes were real programmes...I liked them because they were beautiful...they showed beautiful things, talked about beautiful things, talked about beautiful things in a beautiful way." (Male, 24) (Mai and Schwander-Sievers 8)

Italian television played a major role for young Albanians in associating Italy with the West as a mythical and unified utopian cultural construction. In other words, the regular 'subversive' presence of Italian television within the vernacular discourse allowed Italy to become the imagined space onto which Albanians first mapped their frustrated hopes and desires. Italy was associated with a utopian perspective of the West as a world of 'free-for-all material plenty' and where everything was possible:

"When Albanians left in 1991, of course there were economic reasons, but most left in order to distance themselves from a place that had been closed for half a century and they thought abroad was a place where they could realize all of their forbidden desires... a very rich place where you could find everything and achieve everything..." (Female, 20) (Mai and Schwander-Sievers 8)

Upon the construction of an imaginative world, the desire to migrate emerged in relation to the possibility to engage with aspects of self-identity which could not be experienced by living in Albania, and whose existence was made available by Italian television networks. Albanian youths had re-negotiated their individual identities through "selective appropriation and rejection of the socio-cultural contexts in which they found themselves as a result of Italian television having fully occupied their cultural landscape" (Mai 942). In this manner, Italian and other television programs were identified with models and imaginations of personhood, which better corresponded to local socio-cultural aspirations than the Albanian ones, and thus, perpetuated the desire to 'escape' and achieve such identities (Mai and Schwander-Sievers 10).

Over time, however, this soon changed and a more pragmatic, informed, and realistic approach towards an idealized version of Italy prevailed across Albanian youth society: "Look, now people don't see it (Italy) as the paradise on earth anymore" (Mai and Schwander-Sievers 11). By 2000, people also started directing their ambitions for Western destinations to other areas where better chances were perceived, such as the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada. When asked about reasons to migrate, the majority – regardless of age, gender, or educational background – still retained ambitions to change and improve their living conditions to lead a 'normal life'

by referring to their desire to conform to the Western liberal-democratic regime of normality (Mai and Schwander-Sievers 15):

"Do I want to migrate? Of course...I would like to go anywhere...to see new places, I would like to...basically have a different life from the one I lead here...I want to lead a normal life...a normal life like the one our peers from other countries lead." (Male, 20) (Mai 14)

The narrative of a 'normal' lifestyle was a key factor in the development of their imagined migratory destination, which included activities such as going to night clubs and partying, and was strongly associated with the Western world (Mai and Schwander-Sievers 5). Albanians desired to improve their material living conditions with their attempt to find a political and economical alternative for their current regime through challenging its material environment. In this sense, the exposure to foreign - in particular Italian - television programs before the end of communism played a crucial role in constructing the imagined world and provoking migration towards a more democratic alternative of 'a normal life' or 'a modern life' (Mai 942).

3.0 Case study: Morocco

Other similar case studies were revealed in China, Honduras, and Morocco where television and media influences collectively constructed imaginations of the West, and subsequently prompted migratory movements (Sun; Sladkova; Sabry).

Most notably, this phenomenon is again observed by Tarik Sabry's study which explored the transformation of Moroccan youth culture and its consumption of Western popular culture that influenced both the 'physical' and 'mental'

emigration of young migrants to Western countries. Since Moroccan media, especially television, is dominated by cheap imports from the United States, Brazil, and Mexico which make up more than 60% of Moroccan television programming, several Moroccan youths had rebuilt and redefined their newly aspired self-identities on such programs (Sabry 5), as seen through the interview of a young Moroccan as he critiques the national media:

"Most of Moroccan made programmes deal with the viewer as a thing, not a human being. They undermine the intelligence of the Moroccan viewer. They show programmes that ridicule the Shelh¹ and the Aroubi² and play on this passé stereotypical conflict by making fun of both...in the meantime they present us with well made programmes like Friends, Baywatch and others. It is like moving from ice to boiling hot water." (6)

Even without the manifestation of migration, Sabry's observations of middle and upper class Moroccan youth, who wore very fashionable Western clothes - Nike trainers, Calvin Klein, Armani, and Lacoste T-shirts - often reflected the strong influences of the mediascapes in local culture (Sabry 14). As a result, such Western liberal motifs assisted in forming cultural ideological links between the media and the individual's identity. Sub-standard television programming from the West had rebuilt distinct and complex intertwined structures within each culture and had established unique relationships through the media, which formed the imagined construct and self-identity. In this manner, such structures stimulated migratory action among youths from several locales around the globe.

4.0 Case study: Japan

In the case of Japanese migrant movements to Western countries, a significant distinction with previous examples occurs, because Japanese individuals are not faced with the composite of political and economic factors obtained by Albania or Morocco. Since Japan possesses similar political and economic standards as those living in the 'West', it is possible to deduce that hopes and desires for migration are most entirely based on cultural objectives, not labour, capital or asylum (Fujita 26). These aspirations of cultural production by Japanese youth encompass the arts and popular culture - such as cuisine, dance, fashion, design, film, fine arts, hairstyling, photography, and popular music - in various Western destinations including New York City (NYC), London, and Paris (Fujita 25). On the other hand, strong similarities and cultural ideological links are also observed between Japanese audiences and television programs and movies - mostly American - which have led to the narrative of an 'imagined world' that influences ambitions for migration through the desire to participate in cultural productions in the 'West'.

Such strongly imbued cultural ideological links can be traced back historically: during the Meiji Restoration in 1854 – when Japanese scholars and leaders were sent out to Britain, France, Germany, and the U.S. to learn as much about the West as possible —Western culture had obtained a strong historical presence in Japan through various exposures to architecture, dance, drawings, fashion, films, and music; and during the post-war period after World War II when the U.S. had secured great influence in political, economic, and cultural relationships with Japan. By the late 1950s,

'America' began to represent itself as an object of consumption, through material goods or media images, which as a result, turned America into a popular source of admiration amongst young people (Fujita 29). Heavy saturation of images of America was conveyed mostly by television broadcasting, which included Westerns, detective stories, and situation comedies. Since the 1970s, however, other foreign 'Western' destinations had also opened up to the Japanese public society (Fujita 29).

Again electronic media, such as television, film, video, and Internet, have played a significant role in establishing these links, as a variety of visual images of Western popular culture and landscapes constructed the imagined West within Japanese discourse.

These mediascapes had been established through historical cultural ideological links and led many Japanese youths to imagine their destination and convinced them to actually migrate. Yuiko Fuijta interviewed several migrants who had set NYC and London as their destinations, since they were presumably the most suitable places for the arts and popular culture – labeling them as 'urban', 'stylish', 'beautiful', 'fun', 'lively', and 'exciting' (Fujita 27). These young people perceived migration to these destinations as both meaningful and available and had great interest and knowledge in American popular culture through the media (Fujita 28):

"I often watched American television programmes. Beverly Hills 90210, Full House, Ally McBeal. I've watched American programmes since I was in junior high school. I've been interested in America for a long time. I don't know why. As for movies, I only watch American ones. I like Soul Food. I love black culture..." (Female, 23) (Fujita 31)

In this sense, America is also seen as an object of admiration – a sense of cultural fetishism. Other forms of misconceptions occurred in the common fabrication of the 'America Dream' as young Japanese youth expected an imagined world which would transmogrify cultural success.

"I am going to NYC to fight. As a means, I'll bring my drawings. I want to change myself. I will go to the gallery that found Basquiat..." (Male, 25) (Fujita 32)

In this manner, the exposure to images and information about America had led to the perception that NYC produced stories of success. They expected to start their lives over and lead a more fulfilling life in a new place that appeared often throughout various mediascapes back home:

"I imagine my life in NYC, by watching movies, which were shot in the city, or reading travel books. Like, I eat here, shop there, in such a place...I want to lead a fulfilling life." (Female, 26) (Fujita 32)

Such narratives remained very similar to those of Albanian youths. Despite the difference in the contextual origin of the imagined West, the goals and the desires of these narratives were very much alike. Even the process of disillusionment of their imagined constructs by young migrants held similar ties as well, such as this example of a Japanese female illustrating her expectations of racial compositions in America:

"I didn't know there were so many Chinese in the city. I thought only white and black people, I mean 'real Americans' lived there." (Female, 23) (Fujita 35)

Even though mediascapes successfully created an illusory or idealized image of life in 'the West', it also succeeded in constructing a utopian narrative, which perpetuated the migration of Japanese youth for the purpose of attaining cultural productions in Western society. In this sense, the study of Japanese young migrants to America reflects a significant cultural ideological link in spite of the absence of political and economic factors of migration seen in most other cases.

Discussion

Beyond the diverse case studies we can further examine and discuss the theoretical constructs of the mediascape and the imagined world, in order to understand the existence of underlying power structures. For instance, one form of cultural hegemony can be observed in the unbalanced flow of media products between countries, identified as the 'one-way flow' of television programs from a few countries of the 'First World' out to the rest of the world (Straubhaar 59). Although the case of Japan is a significant exception, other technically dependent countries can be viewed as caught up in a postcolonial web of cultural imperialism. In this case, culture and communication are seen as the ideological structure of the world capitalist economy's expansion, therefore, the television mediascape can be seen as another 'First World' product sold at high prices by 'First World' producers to 'Third World' consumers, resulting in a form of asymmetrical interdependence (Straubhaar 17). This model would further strengthen the dominant narrative, in which Western cultures represent

 $^{^{1}}$ Shelh is a term used to describe a native Moroccan in the local language.

² Aroubi is a term used to describe those of Arab descent in the local language.

the 'stronger' culture and other non-Western cultures, represent the 'weaker' culture – or the subordinate culture (Sabry 6). This hegemonic structure also includes an ideological role for television, which makes 'Third World' residents content with their circumstance as lower paid consumers of 'First World' Products.

More significant and universal, however, is the hegemonic yearning for Western liberal-democratic normality of a utopian 'promised land' amongst the global youth, a unanimous search for both a 'normal' and 'different' life imagined to exist in Western regions due to strongly developed imagined narratives (Mai 14). Regardless of political or economical status, those in Albania or Japan both displayed powerful desires to achieve Western liberal ideals, but were both oblivious to the subconscious forces of cultural hegemony underlying such desires.

These dualistic views of hegemony and imperialism have also been heavily contested, as contemporary analysis has depicted a much more complex relationship of powers based on hybridization, internalization, and the autonomous adoption of global networks and technologies, which liberate nations from the potential of an ominous imperialistic presence (Appadurai 1996). For instance, by the late 1990s and early 2000s, there was a significant decrease in United States television programs imported in foreign regions (Straubhaar 176). This was because several countries were able to instead replace programmes with those made within the country. These self-produced shows still emulated Western allegories and storylines, but the crucial point is that the Unites States was no longer the puppeteer of a world system of images but "only one node of a complex transnational construction of imaginary landscapes" (Appadurai 31). For instance, the Dominican Republic now imports technology

from both the US and Japan and content from both the US and Mexico (Straubhaar 22). Brazil also depends on others for the manufacture of more sophisticated information and communication technologies, which restricts its possibilities, but is relatively autonomous in using those communication technologies and the cultural content of imported technologies as enabling tools to create new forms of culture. Thus, the relationship of this international structure includes several levels and layers of power, too intricate to label as a binary contest between the 'rich' and the 'poor' or the 'West' and the 'Rest'.

Conclusion

In this manner, electronic media, such as the television, has established powerful cultural ideological links across the globe. By exploring these linkages it becomes evident that they not only fabricate a misrepresented image of the 'West', but also subsequently, provoke action and migration of individuals towards their imagined destinations. Through observing case studies in post-communist Albania and other regions, which illustrate such processes of imaginative narrative construction, as well as migration of Japanese youth who obtain a fairly culturally driven ethos, it is possible to observe the unique phenomenon of the sociocultural force that redefines the dynamics of global human movements. In this sense, it is also important to recognize how imaginative identities are specific and distinct according to the historical and socio-cultural context deeply embedded within each region. Furthermore, this examination identified possibly latent structures of power, such as cultural hegemony or imperialism, which shed useful light on the concept of 'imagined worlds' as a potentially malevolent or benign human construct. Although this analysis provided only a brief overview of a unique and massive phenomenon, it provided important prospects for further reshaping and redefining the current structures and paradigms, which exist within our vernacular imagination.

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Endnotes

Shelh is a term used to describe a native Moroccan in the local language.

Aroubi is a term used to describe those of Arab descent in the local language.

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A Large Room Half Full Of Gold: Exploring The Gold Commodity Chain

Ruth You Ree Kim

Abstract: Although some 15 to 20 percent of the world's gold is currently supplied by artisanal and small-scale gold miners, their identity and the significance of the role they play in the mining community often go unnoticed in the public sector (Schein). The various social and environmental processes that bring artisanally mined gold to the North American market also remain hidden through the process of commodity fetishism, whereby the crucial linkages between geographies of production and consumption are ignored. Through a commodity chain analysis, I will explore these complex middle linkages and trace the path artisanal gold makes on its journey from the informal mines in Peru to North American and world gold markets.

"The desire for gold is the most universal and deeply rooted commercial instinct of the human race."

- Gerald M. Loeb

As in the sixteenth century, when the Spanish Francisco Pizarro deceived Atahuallpa— the last indigenous Incan king— into giving him a large room half full of gold and two rooms full of silver, today the demand for gold remains high. The President of Peru, Alejandro Toledo, recently claimed that the country cannot "allow minerals to remain underground, dead, when Peru needs them" (Hall). In 2000, mining exports brought Peru more than \$3.2 billion, accounting for nearly half of its export earnings and "a much-needed boost to a standstill economy" (Veiga, "New Technologies" 41).

Gold consistently remains as one of the most

sought-after commodities in the world, but in general most locally produced gold is not bought by local consumers. Just as Peruvian gold was seized by foreigners led by Pizarro in 1532, today most Peruvian gold still ends up in foreign hands, albeit through different methods. Moreover, most consumers of this commodity remain unaware of the painstaking labour and social costs required to bring gold to the North American market.

Although some 15 to 20 percent of the world's gold is currently supplied by artisanal and small-scale mines (ASM), the significant role artisanal and small-scale gold miners play in the intricacies of the world's gold market remains obscure (Schein). Since ASM provides such a large portion of the gold supply, it is imperative to examine the identity and work of artisanal miners. Furthermore, the social and environmental implications of ASM extend beyond production locales to have over-

reaching effects and influences on a global scale. This paper provides an analysis of how the social and environmental conditions of ASM gold production and consumption are obscured through a fetishization of the commodity. To do so, a commodity chain approach is used to trace the path artisanal gold makes on its journey from the informal mines in Peru to the hands of North American consumers.

1.0 Commodity Fetishism and Commodity Chains

Karl Marx used the phrase "the fetishism of commodities" to explain the social and geographical relations concealed by the market (qtd. in Harvey 422). In his interpretation of commodity fetishism, Harvey states that the items put for sale on the supermarket shelf "are mute" and consumers "cannot see the fingerprints of exploitation upon them or tell immediately what part of the world they are from" (Ibid). The fingerprints have been conveniently "wiped off", in the sense that the complex social practises and relationships that connect geographical places of production and consumption have been erased or hidden, to the benefit and profit of multinational corporations (Sundberg).

One way to examine the social and environmental geographies of a commodity is through a commodity chain, which traces the "production of tradable goods from their inception through their elaboration and transport to their final destination in the hands of consumers" (Topik, Marichal, and Frank 14). Thus, a commodity chain analysis plots the geographical interactions, connections and linkages that carry the product from its place of origin to its consumption by the market. Commodity chains rarely comprise singular and direct paths between the locality of production and the destination of consumption, however—

their associated network geographies are most complex.

2.0 Introduction to Artisanal and Small Scale Mining in Latin America

As the price of gold has soared—it has risen "235 percent in the past eight years"— the number of artisanal gold miners has also risen (Larmer). Today, the estimated number of artisanal gold miners is between 10 and 15 million people in over 70 countries, with some 50-100 million people directly and indirectly involved with artisanal gold mining in what Veiga refers to as the "biggest gold rush the world has ever seen" (Veiga, "Global Mercury Project" 4).

Although artisanal and small-scale mining operations embody various characteristics that are "site-specific and fraught with cultural and economic significance," a general definition for ASM encompasses "small, medium, informal, legal, and illegal miners who use rudimentary techniques to extract any kind of mineral substance" (Veiga, Maxson, and Hylander 436). Hentschel, Hruschka, and Priester further characterize ASM as involving a "lack or a very reduced degree of mechanization" coupled with a "lack of social security" (5). Often, the workers of artisanal mines are thought of as a well-kept secret, tucked away from public view and discussions so that they may not "tarnish the image of [the] mining industry" (Veiga, "New Technologies" 4).

3.0 Production of Artisanal Gold in Peru

In recent years, Peru has risen to prominence as the most important gold-producing country in Latin America. In Peru, many gold deposits are recovered from the alluvial and terrace deposits in Madre de Dios and its tributary rivers (Veiga, "Mercury in Artisanal Gold Mining" 4). Once the hard rocks are crushed

and ground, the gold is separated by means of gravity concentration and is amalgamated, typically with mercury.

After the process of amalgamation, the excess mercury is removed, commonly by retorting or burning the amalgam, leaving a "gold doré." Typically, it is at this stage that the gold is sold by the miner to a local village gold or jewellery shop, where it is once again re-melted in order to separate the still sizeable presence of mercury in the metal. In Peru, all gold is sold to gold shops, where the miners get reasonably fair prices for their gold (Veiga).

4.0 Artisanal Miners and their Social Conditions

Typically, artisanal gold miners are "poor, hard working, illiterate, with little or no formal education, under health stresses, malnourished, and often somewhat transient" (Veiga, Maxson, and Hylander 1). Although the informality of artisanal mining allows members of rural communities to join the labour force easily with low investment costs, there is little to no technical assistance provided for ASM workers; most of the training and knowledge is passed along by word-of-mouth (Veiga, "New Technologies" 7). Moreover, inadequate governmental regulations often fail to set any kind of legal framework with which the miners may safely work. People come to ASM out of a strict and necessary obligation to find work amidst a poverty-stricken environment, and to avoid "complete social marginalization" (Schein; Veiga, "New Technologies" 6).

It is estimated that approximately "30 percent of the world's artisanal miners are women" (Hinton, Veiga, and Beinhoff 1). The majority of these women work on "transporting and processing materials as opposed to 'digging," and in "gendered roles" as, for instance, cooks and prostitutes (Hinton, Veiga, and Beinhoff

2; Lima 7). The processing of gold in ASM is "all women," according to Veiga. In addition, because mercury retorting commonly takes place inside the home and many gold shops are located near markets and in residential neighbourhoods near schools, many women and children unknowingly consume large quantities of toxic mercury vapours. Women who breast-feed soon after amalgam is burned in the same room may also be exposed mercury levels at least double the World Health Organization's instantaneous risk limit for acute toxicity (Cordy). Over the years, some international environmental organizations have pressured Latin American governments to enforce better regulations for dealing with artisanal miners (Veiga, "New Technologies" 5), but the inability to identify alternative sources of employment means that the situation remains fundamentally unresolved.

5.0 Environmental consequences

Over 70 countries are documented as releasing between 640 to 1350 tonnes of mercury per annum into the environment by means of artisanal and small-scale gold mining (Veiga). Mercury, whether it is released through tailings dumped into the river or as aerosols. severely contaminates natural sites with poorly understood repercussions on the flora and fauna (Cordy). Among its many detrimental side effects, some of the symptoms associated with mercury poisoning include progressive loss of fine motor control- possibly leading to partial crippling, memory loss, renal dysfunction, visual impairment, numbness of the extremities, and impairment of hearing and speech (Cordy; Veiga, "Mercury in Artisanal Gold Mining" 10).

Other environmental problems caused by artisanal gold mining include water siltation, soil and landscape degradation, destruction of habitats, loss of organic soil, and deforestation (Veiga, "Global Mercury Project" 8). Swamps and soil may be polluted with oil and toxic chemicals kept near the processing sites, and the pollution and siltation of rivers and creeks affect drinking water, forcing people to go long distances to fetch relatively cleaner water. These environmental concerns never remain localized or site-specific; pollution eventually spreads out to different parts of the globe regardless of its place of origin. Thus, environmental concerns are a huge factor in prompting more research and awareness on ASM activities.

6.0 Distribution and Transportation Networks

Once the artisanally mined gold has left the miner's hands, both the environmental repercussions of its production and the gold itself assume a face of anonymity. The gold shops, after buying mixed gold from ASM, sell it to a refiner, which is usually located in a larger city. At the refineries, the gold is refined and purified with acids and is sold to large corporations. Since jewellery accounts for about two-thirds of the demand for gold, "generating a record \$53.5 billion in worldwide sales in 2007," most of the gold sold by refineries goes to large jewellery manufacturing corporations (Larmer).

Gold, especially artisanal gold, is problematic to trace as gold from ASM and non-ASM "are mixed at the national buyer or refiner site" (Schein). In essence, as soon as the gold is melted down and refined, it becomes mixed with other refined gold from all over the world making it almost impossible to trace the exact path gold makes from point of production to consumption. Furthermore, in order to meet the demands of investors and jewellers, refiners buy unrefined gold from miners or recyclers, further complicating the traceability of

gold in today's markets (Schein).

This has implications for Canadian gold as well. Although Canada produces much of its own gold, major Canadian organizations such as the Royal Canadian Mint or Kitco sell and buy other varieties of gold on the market. Hence, some of the gold inevitably comes from mixed sources and gets trickled down into the department store retailers (Schein). A jewellery manufacturer in Canada can also purchase pure gold from "a distributor, bank, bullion house and from US refiners," all of which may contain gold with ASM sources (Larmer).

7.0 Gold in Western Society: Symbolisms, Identities, and Global Perspectives

Consumers of gold have often been seduced and conditioned to consume gold products through enticing advertisements that obscure the often detrimental social and environmental consequences involved with unregulated productions. By ignoring the complex connections between geographies of production and consumption, consumers create barriers that separate them from the reality of social conditions of producers. They have too readily accepted minimal accountability and responsibility as a way of life, widening the gap that exists between producers and consumers. It is only when they increase their awareness and knowledge, and exercise their consumer power with discretion and forethought, that they can begin to take steps to better understand some of the social implications behind their purchases.

Because gold's footsteps are essentially invisible, purchasers of gold are often unable to recognize exploitation processes involved in its production. One possible solution is to purchase fair trade gold. Currently, the Association for Responsible Mining (ARM) in collaboration with Fairtrade Gold is offering traceability of

responsible ASM gold from artisanal mining communities. Fair trade gold is much easier to track than ASM and non-ASM gold, although this represents only a partial response to the problem of unequal power relations within the gold commodity chain.

Veiga outlines some further steps that may be helpful in increasing awareness of ASM and offering solutions to some of its social and environmental degradations. Firstly, it is vital to treat dredged materials and remove mercury from them. Secondly, spreading knowledge and awareness of environmental issues to local communities and offering education and training in proper gold processing methods may also help to curb the often-unconscious destruction of the environment (Veiga, "New Technologies 53-58). In addition, technical assistance from NGOs, researchers and governmental agencies may also prove helpful. Lastly, governmental law enforcement and monitoring of ASM activities is crucial, both to assist workers and to reduce environmental degradation. It may also be useful to fund the introduction and demonstration of cleaner technology (Cordy).

Conclusion

It is vital that socially active and aware consumers attempt to understand and unravel the complicated linkages between the production and consumption of artisanal and small-scale gold via its commodity chain. It is necessary to

problematize the illusion of a boundary separating 'us' as consumers in North America, with 'them' as producers in Latin America, by taking action with regards to policy and political change. Observing and recognizing how these material processes are defined by space and time is the first step consumers can take as responsible and conscious citizens, but spreading awareness and knowledge about the issues at hand will also help to broaden our understandings of such distantiated forms of commodity production and consumption.

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Indonesia and Its Relationship with East Timor: The Geopolitics behind International Pressure and Sanctions

Ryan Lledo

Abstract: As a Portuguese trading post during the colonial period, East Timor was distinct from the Indonesian islands, which were a property of the Dutch. However, due to its geographic location within the Indonesian archipelago, Indonesia soon considered the state as part of its own, upon East Timor's independence from Portugal. A major factor to Indonesia's idealism of a united state encompassing the entire stretch of the archipelago were fundamental principles aimed at unifying an otherwise diverse region. Thus, through brash military intervention, Indonesia occupied East Timor within days of the small state's independence. This act of force was backed by the United States under Cold War implications. Throughout its 24-year occupation of East Timor, from 1975 to 1999, Indonesia performed brutal acts of violence unto the native East Timor population. This would be largely ignored by the international community which continued to support Indonesia due to the country's economic prospects. However, this would change in the 1990s as international exposure of Indonesia's human rights violations began to intensify. International pressure for peace in the region and sanctions against the Indonesian government reached its peak in the late 1990s. This paper intends to explore the international community's outlook of Indonesia's occupation of East Timor throughout the conflict and offer some explanation to the shift in political support which would eventually lead to the UN-supervised transition towards East Timor's independence in 1999.

On 30 August 1999 the East Timorese cast their ballots on a UN-supervised referendum for independence from Indonesia. This marked a turning point in a 24-year conflict between the East Timorese and the occupying Indonesian government (Kiernan 199). Overshadowed by Middle Eastern conflict and Cold War tension in Vietnam, Cambodia, and elsewhere, Indonesia invaded, occupied and annexed the self-declared, newly independent East Timor on 7 December 1975 (Kiernan 203). This was preceded by the withdrawal of the

Portuguese colonial administration in 1974. Following Indonesia's invasion of East Timor, the United States, Australia, and the European Union (EU) have been the most vocal and influential in Indonesia's strained relationship with East Timor because of their economic interests in Indonesia and, in Australia's case, its position as a regional power. Cold War interest in eliminating the potential threat of communist power in an independent East Timor led the United States and Australia initially to support Indonesia in its invasion and occupation of East

Timor in 1975 (Kiernan 204). Furthermore, the United States and Australia were interested in maintaining a healthy relationship with Indonesia, as the country is resource-rich and has a large population, making it a lucrative market for foreign investment (Wheeler and Dunne 806). This paper explores Indonesia's actions during its annexation of the East Timorese. It argues that independence was granted to East Timor because of international pressure, trade sanctions, and deteriorating economic conditions.

1.0 The Role of the Cold War

Indonesia is bound by a philosophical foundation of five principles called the Pancasila. Upon Indonesia's independence from the Netherlands in 1945, President Sukarno promulgated these principles as the foundation for unity and nationalism in a diverse and geographically extensive country. Among these principles is Persatuan Indonesia, which literally means 'one Indonesia', aims to consolidate the archipelago as a unified nation. In light of this, the Pancasila is represented on the Indonesian coat of arms through meaningful symbols and the official motto: "Bhinneka Tunggal Ika," or "Unity in Diversity" (Frederick and Worden). The idea behind the creation of these symbols is to establish an Indonesian identity to the people, who had known nothing but colonialism and could not identify themselves with people on the other side of the country.

Decades after the manifestation of the *Pancasila*, President Suharto's perspective of the *Pancasila* plays a role in Indonesia's intentions with the newly formed East Timor. In a meeting in Jakarta with US President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on 6 December 1975, just a day before Indonesia's invasion of East Timor, President Suharto raised the issue of Indonesia's "problem of Timor" (Kier-

nan 200). In the meeting, Suharto stressed that in East Timor's case, "an independent country would hardly be viable" and therefore must be incorporated into Indonesia (Kiernan 204). In contrast to Sukarno's intentions, Suharto's perspective of the Pancasila was very Java-focused. He believed that Jakarta should have control of the entire expanse of the archipelago in order to bring unity to the area (Frederick and Worden). By playing on the US position in the Cold War, Suharto would later convince Ford and Kissinger that "the problem is that those who want independence are those who are Communist-influenced" (Kiernan 204). As a result, Kissinger would authorize the planned Indonesian invasion of East Timor with the following message to President Suharto:

You appreciate that the use of US-made arms could create problems. . . . It depends on how we construe it; whether it is in self-defense or is a foreign operation. It is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly. We would be able to influence the reaction in America if whatever happens, happens after we return. This way there would be less chance of people talking in an unauthorized way. . . . We understand your problem and the need to move quickly. . . . Whatever you do, however, we will try to handle in the best way possible. ... If you have made plans, we will do our best to keep everyone quiet until the President returns home. (Kiernan 200)

2.0 A Genocide Ignored

However, contrary to the *Pancasila*, unity between the Indonesians (especially the Javanese) and the East Timorese were substantially non-existent in the period of occupation from 1975 to 1999. Indeed, Indonesia's rule over the East Timorese was marked by widespread vio-

lence and a lack of human rights. In a comparative study of the situation in East Timor and in Cambodia, Ben Kiernan argues that like the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, Indonesia began committing genocide on the East Timorese during its 1975 invasion. According to Kiernan, from 1975 to 1999 the East Timor death toll reached approximately 150,000 people, or twenty percent of East Timor's 1990 population (Kiernan 200; Brinkhoff). This is comparable to the death toll in Cambodia in proportion to the state's total population, where more than onefifth of the population was eradicated in the 1975-79 genocide (Kiernan 200). Much of the violence can be attributed to Indonesian brutality against the East Timorese, which sparked the creation of the Timorese resistance movement 'Fretilin.' The Fretilin (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor) was the driving force for the East Timor independence movement throughout Indonesian occupation (Kiernan 203). Present-day East Timorese leaders, such as Xanana Gusmao and Jose Ramos Horta, were instrumental founders and leaders of the Fretilin.

The Fretilin resistance movement retaliated against many Indonesian atrocities, which Kiernan describes as genocide. Indonesian Human Rights violations included the gunning down of hundreds of Timorese and Chinese at random in the streets at the start of the 1975 invasion (Kiernan 210). More recent human rights violations have also been recorded, such as the Dili/ Santa Cruz massacre in 1991 and the Liquica church massacre in 1999. In both cases, Indonesian soldiers shot at unarmed protestors, resulting in approximately two hundred deaths as a result of the Liquica massacre (Kiernan 211). Indonesia maintained that only nineteen people were killed in the Dili massacre, after soldiers were provoked, but Amnesty International and witnesses claim that one hundred

people were deliberately murdered (Amnesty International).

Amnesty International has also documented other cases of disregard for human rights in East Timor. These include cases in which resistance members were tortured, ill-treated and eventually executed by firing squad under the detainment of the Indonesian government. Furthermore, thousands of people were imprisoned because of peaceful political and religious views. Apart from East Timor, the Indonesian government has been no stranger to other human rights violations, many committed within Indonesia itself. For instance, in 1965, the kidnapping and execution of top anticommunist generals resulted in a retaliatory military (led by then major general Suharto) manhunt and mass murder of approximately half a million communist supporters (Cribb 232-33). Immediately after Suharto ousted the former Sukarno administration through a military coup in 1966, Suharto placed Sukarno under house arrest until his death in 1970. Despite the invasion of East Timor in 1975, the United States overlooked many reported political killings due to their support of Indonesia and the larger fight against communism during the Cold War. Indeed, despite the inhumane eradication of communist actors in Indonesia and action against the East Timorese, the United States continued to support President Suharto's dictatorship until its end in 1998.

Fueled by rising oil prices in the 1970s and the discovery of oil deposits off Sumatra, the Indonesian economy consistently grew at about seven percent per year through the late 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s (Tomohara and Takii 5). Not surprisingly, the United States and other investors took great interest in Indonesia's oil production led rapid economic growth and its abundant supply of low-cost labor in textile and other manufacturing sectors. Foreign

direct investment (FDI) in Indonesia increased from \$0.6 billion in 1988 to \$6.2 billion by 1996 (Tomohara and Takii 5). Therefore, in addition to the Cold War interests mentioned earlier, the United States ignored Indonesian brutality in East Timor for economic interests as well. These economic interests spurred trade between Indonesia and its foreign investors as the country provided cheaper manufacturing costs through low labor costs for consumers in the United States and elsewhere. On the other hand, East Timor, a small province of Indonesia during that time, could not demonstrate the economic or political significance necessary to garner enough international support to push effectively for its independence.

3.0 Exposed and Forced to Change

International opinion began to shift by the late 1990s as documentation of further Indonesian military (known locally as the TNI or Tentara Nasional Indonesia) brutality began to escalate. Reports by major international publications such as The Economist ("Diplomatic"), The Christian Science Monitor (Thoenes) and the New Republic ("Deserted") increased awareness of the situation in East Timor, resulting in political lobbying and protests worldwide. A prime example of this movement occurred in Australia, when 40,000 protestors gathered in Melbourne on 19 September 1999 to call for Indonesia to pull out of East Timor, and for war crimes tribunals against Indonesia to take place (Takver). Protestors in Australia also encouraged the boycott of Bali, a popular Indonesian tourist destination for Australians.

The Asian Economic Crisis of 1997–98 can be seen as a major factor in the shift of political positioning regarding the East Timor issue. Indonesia was perhaps among the worst affected by the economic crisis in Asia, not only economically but also politically. Indonesia's GDP

contracted by twelve percent in the first half of 1998 alone (World Trade Organization) and widespread unemployment and other financial trouble caused by the dramatic drop in FDI created a political backlash that led to violent riots and the eventual overthrow of President Suharto. This would aid East Timor's independence movement from two angles. First, it caused decreasing economic support from the United States, as it shifted major investments away from Indonesia and into China because of political uncertainty. The Indonesian textile industry nearly collapsed as companies such as Nike, Levi-Strauss and other clothing lines reduced their operations in Indonesia in order to move into other lucrative manufacturing countries such as China, Vietnam and India (Wheeler and Dunne 810). With reduced economic interests in Indonesia, American and European companies no longer benefited from Indonesia's competitive labor costs. With fewer interests in the country, the American and European governments had less incentive to protect those interests in Indonesia, and thus the case for restoring human rights in East Timor was strengthened. The Asian Economic Crisis of 1997-98 can simply be seen as a blow to Indonesia's endorsement of its economy and therefore, its ability to silence its human rights record in East Timor. Lastly, following Suharto's resignation in 1998, the political strength of his administration was no longer a barrier to the East Timor resistance movement.

4.0 The International Response

Ultimately, the United States took the lead in establishing sanctions against Indonesia, as the Clinton administration (1993–2000) became increasingly frustrated with the deteriorating human rights situation in East Timor. It is ironic that, as a former supporter of President Suharto and his actions in East Timor, the United States

would completely reverse its position after a change in the presiding US administration and in the economic conditions in Indonesia. The United States had previously imposed as military arms sanctions against Indonesia in 1992, after the Dili/Santa Cruz massacre was reported (Johnston). These sanctions were later tightened into a complete military arms embargo, with an increased TNI presence in East Timor in the early part of 1999. Indonesia, a long time customer of US arms (such as F16 fighter jets), was now pressured to readdress its position in East Timor (Morrissey). The EU later followed the US example and imposed its own arms embargo against Indonesia in 1999 (Kenety). Indonesia's F16 fighter jets would eventually be grounded due to the lack of spare parts and maintenance hindered by the embargo (Morrissey). Additionally, because of financial constraints, the new Indonesian President Habibie was desperate to secure loans and other financial aid from the international community and international support. As a result, President Habibie surrendered to US President Clinton's pressure to "invite" UN peacekeepers in East Timor, and worked with Fretilin forces to arrange an independence referendum in August 2001. In an election that was overshadowed by widespread violence by those sympathetic to the Indonesian military, so-called militias threatened to massacre East Timor voters should they vote for independence (Kiernan 203). Despite this threat, the referendum results recorded a vote of seventynine percent in favor of independence, and this was recognized internationally on 20 May 2002 (Kiernan 224). Indonesia, however, continued to feel the effects of the international arms embargo through the first years of the twentyfirst century. Unlike the EU, which removed its arms embargo by the year 2000 (Kenety), the United States maintained its sanctions until 2005 (Morrissey). The military arms embargo affected Indonesia significantly, even after it granted independence to East Timor, because it was forced to find alternative sources for weapons procurement. In 2004 and again in 2007, Indonesia turned to Russia for fighter jets and submarines in a large-scale bilateral trade deal (Haswidi). The 2004 agreement involved a \$200 million loan for Indonesia's purchase of four Russian-made Sukhoi fighter jets and a further \$1 billion for an additional six jets, tanks, and a submarine in 2007. In addition, Russia agreed to exchange discounted Russian military arsenal for subsidized Indonesian textiles (Haswidi).

Conclusion

The Indonesia-East Timor relationship is a prime example of changing geopolitics of trade and economic interests having an effect on political and social conditions within South East Asia. Economic powers such as the United States, the EU, and Australia rely on rapidly emerging economies such as Indonesia's for favorable trade and manufacturing conditions, just as Indonesia relies on them for foreign investment and economic development. The timing of Indonesia's occupation of East Timor during the Cold War era occurred when the United States and its allies placed a priority on the fight against communism. As a result, this enabled dictators such as Suharto to use this to their advantage and gain their backing on a decision that was not of the best interest of the East Timorese people. However, these factors, once weakened, were the catalyst in which geopolitical positioning changed and human rights in East Timor would be eventually recognized. In the post-Cold War era, Indonesia had to rethink its international strategy in order to protect vital trade agreements and search for new arms deals.

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'No Sit No Lie', Kiss Democracy Goodbye: Panhandling, Regulation, And Vancouver's Public Realm

Emily Smith

Abstract: Project Civil City is a report developed by Mayor Sam Sullivan to address public disorder in Vancouver. The policy approach it uses is based on the controversial "broken windows" theory. Aggressive panhandling is a specific target of Project Civil City. However, the initiatives proposed to combat aggressive panhandling are based on a flawed public consultation process and effectively criminalize people's livelihoods. They also promote spatial discrimination along class lines, increase social polarization, and threaten democracy in Vancouver's public spaces.

Project Civil City is a report developed by Mayor Sam Sullivan in November 2006 to address public disorder in Vancouver. One of several aspects of public disorder addressed in this report is aggressive panhandling (City of Vancouver 22). It is argued that aggressive panhandling makes citizens feel unsafe, erodes Vancouver's public image, and negatively affects tourism (City of Vancouver 4). As such, aggressive panhandling is suggested to contribute to a growing sense among citizens that "Vancouver is losing its international reputation" (City of Vancouver, Project 4). In response to this issue, the City of Vancouver has proposed initiatives such as a "No Sit No Lie" bylaw, street redesign to discourage panhandling, reduced access to washrooms and other facilities in public parks, and increased police presence and by-law enforcement powers (Administrative 32).

Scholarly work on aggressive panhandling by-laws in other cities is used here to evaluate both Project Civil City and the related "Project

Civil City Action Plan" developed by the City of Vancouver in their March 2007 Administrative Report (14). Findings suggest that Project Civil City offers an ineffective policy approach that will have a detrimental effect on Vancouver communities. An insufficient public consultation process was used to justify initiatives for which sufficient laws already exist. Furthermore, these initiatives criminalize those living in poverty and promote spatial discrimination for the sake of improving the urban aesthetic and fostering processes of capital accumulation associated with globalization. Initiatives targeting aggressive panhandling in Project Civil City instead cast a wide net to produce a socially exclusive and undemocratic (re)construction of Vancouver's public spaces.

1.0 Broken Windows Theory

The policy approach of Project Civil City is based on the controversial "broken windows" theory which "[assumes] that felony crimes

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spring from environments in which forms of nonviolent deviance are tolerated" (Duneier, 255). Mitchell Duneier notes that heavy policing of public disorder was pioneered in New York throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and has been celebrated as successful due to a significant drop in crime rates since 1993 (158). However, during this time, crime rates also dropped in other cities that were not using this approach, therefore, the success of "broken windows" policing is still "a matter of fierce debate" (Duneier, 158). Furthermore, Duneier documents the widespread abuse of public disorder laws by New York police officers, who appear frustrated by the increased workload of policing minor infractions and the ineffectiveness of issuing tickets to those who cannot afford to pay fines (260). They routinely seize and discard individuals' private belongings without following appropriate ticketing procedures, a process which discriminates against those who live and/or work on the street (Duneier, 257). Despite this, policy makers continue to look to New York as a centre for innovation and dissemination of urban policy approaches such as "broken windows" policing.

2.0 Flawed Consultation Process

Project Civil City included a public consultation process to explore the issue of aggressive panhandling, as well as other aspects of public disorder in Vancouver (City of Vancouver 7). In particular the "Community Impacts of Poverty and Addiction" section relies heavily on the findings of a non-scientific web-based survey of citizens to make a case for regulation of aggressive panhandling (City of Vancouver, Project 22). Broad-brush initiatives designed to address aggressive panhandling by excluding panhandlers, homeless, and others from public space were developed from the findings of Project Civil City, and are summarized in the "Project Civil City Action Plan" (City of Vancouver, Administrative 14-38).

Examining the survey in more detail, findings show that 83.35% of respondents are concerned about aggressive panhandling (City of Vancouver, Project 22). However, because the web-based survey method is one of selfselection by respondents rather than a random city-wide sample, it is not likely an accurate representation of Vancouverites' views on the issue. Participants with strong views on aggressive panhandling may be more likely to respond in this type of survey, creating a skewed perspective that does not account for the views of others who may feel less strongly. As such, those with a strong concern about panhandling may be overrepresented in the Project Civil City survey. This type of non-representative sample can lead to what Barrett Lee and Chad Farrell cite as "a mismatch between public opinion and public policy" (318).

In a U.S. study, Lee and Farrell analyze national data from a telephone survey about how the American public responds to panhandlers. Their findings suggest that less than onetenth of respondents change "where they go for shopping or entertainment...or how they use mass transportation" due to their experiences with panhandlers (315). Their findings also indicate that having in-person, social encounters with panhandlers "makes a domiciled individual more willing to defend homeless people's right to panhandle, not less so" (315).

While the findings of Lee and Farrell cannot be directly applied to Vancouver, they suggest that a representative sample of Vancouverites might present a more sympathetic view on panhandling and encourage a different public policy approach to Project Civil City. If, as Lee and Farrell suggest, relatively few people feel sufficiently threatened by panhandlers to change their behaviour, and encountering pan-

handlers tends to increase public willingness to advocate for panhandlers' rights; therefore, the logic of implementing initiatives designed to exclude panhandlers from public space is questionable.

3.0 Criminalizing Livelihoods rather than Aggression

3.1 Sufficient Laws Already Exist

By-laws targeting aggressive panhandling are irrelevant because sufficient laws against uttering threats and committing physical assault already exist (Collins & Blomley; Graser; Mitchell). Graser undertakes a legal analysis of anti-aggressive panhandling by-laws, examining Ontario's Safe Streets Act as an example (53). She observes that the federal Criminal Code already covers the issues of threatening and aggressive solicitation addressed by the Safe Streets Act (55). Graser concludes that any charge under the Safe Streets Act could be subject to constitutional challenge, because the provincial law may be considered ultra vires (that is, outside of the provincial scope of authority) (55).

The scope of Project Civil City may be considered similarly. If the aim is to target aggressive panhandling, then additional by-laws regulating aggressive solicitation are at best an unnecessary duplication of legal conventions already established in higher levels of authority. At worst, a poorly crafted by-law may be ultra vires and result in unconstitutional charges laid against panhandlers.

3.2 Spatial Discrimination along Class Lines

The observation that aggressive panhandling behaviour is already prohibited by existing laws, and that anti-aggressive panhandling by laws tend to have impacts beyond their stated purpose, have led scholars to question why

municipalities continue to create such by-laws. Collins and Blomley contend that "the purpose of these by-laws is less to deter or punish aggression than to facilitate the removal of panhandlers from key downtown spaces" (44).

For example, the only panhandling by-law proposed under Project Civil City is the "No Sit No Lie" by-law (City of Vancouver, Administrative 32). Coupled with increased police presence and enforcement powers, this by-law effectively criminalizes sitting or lying down in public spaces like city streets and sidewalks (City of Vancouver, Administrative 32). This approach extends beyond Project Civil City's original objective of targeting aggressive panhandling, instead excluding panhandlers, homeless, and others from public space whether or not their behaviour is aggressive. Mitchell argues that such an approach is inherently classist, because these are "the only spaces the homeless have left" and, in comparison, those who have private homes are largely unaffected by such a by-law (305).

3.3 Social Polarization and the Global City

Mitchell, as well as Collins and Blomley, draw a connection between spatial discrimination against panhandlers and social polarization stemming from processes of globalization. Collins and Blomley note trends toward increasing investment in urban downtowns to facilitate capital accumulation. In such an environment, "urban elites" frame panhandlers "as a potential threat" to the retail market share and continued investment in downtown development on which the global city depends (Collins and Blomley 54).

Similarly, Mitchell argues that panhandling is often criminalized to sanitize the urban image for the sake of capitalism, a practice which "[raises] a politics of aesthetics above the politics of survival" (326). Mitchell terms this "the annihilation of space by law", where space for the homeless and marginalized to enact their livelihoods through panhandling is eliminated in favour of creating an exclusive, "purified," and controlled urban landscape (322).

Vancouver's status as a global city seeking to promote capital accumulation is clearly reflected in Project Civil City. A letter from the mayor, Sam Sullivan, cites the city's opportunity to host the "world class-event" of the 2010 Olympic Games as an impetus for the project (City of Vancouver, Project 3). Additionally, 81% of survey respondents are cited as being "very concerned that Vancouver is losing its international reputation" (City of Vancouver, Project 20).

While Vancouver may seek to improve its public image by criminalizing panhandling, Collins and Blomley incisively point out "the panhandler is as much a product of the contemporary downtown as is the anti-panhandling by-law", since gentrification and downtown investment are often associated with continuing social polarization in the global city (54). Project Civil City's criminalization of panhandling is thus a flawed approach, raising the prospect that Vancouver's pursuit of world-class city status will further entrench social polarization, increasing urban poverty and the associated need to panhandle.

3.4 Erosion of Democracy in Vancouver's Public Space

Finally, the exclusion of panhandlers, homeless, and other marginalized groups from public space threatens democracy in Vancouver's public realm. Collins and Blomley contend that the idea of a democratic public realm is intimately tied to access to material space. They suggest that "to be excluded from the public sphere is not only to be silenced politically but also to be denied standing as a

member of a political community" (55). In its attempt to refine the public image by removing panhandlers from the streets of Vancouver, Project Civil City excludes marginalized groups from political discourse and casts an undemocratic shadow which changes the function of the public realm for everyone.

Conclusion

Graser argues that bylaws created to reduce panhandling and increase public safety "criminalize the poor, censor criticism of social problems, and visually sanitize streets and public places to the detriment of the public" (48). The same can be said of anti-panhandling initiatives associated with Project Civil City.

Based on a flawed and misleading public consultation process, Project Civil City excludes marginal groups such as panhandlers and the homeless from public space by criminalizing their presence. Rather than specifically targeting aggressive panhandling, initiatives in Project Civil City entrench social polarization and threaten democracy in the public realm. Removing panhandlers from public space reduces their opportunity to engage in political discourse and further marginalizes a group which has had little political agency to begin with. As a result, Project Civil City's cleansing of public space does a disservice to the electorate by hiding the failure of local government to adequately care for its citizens in poverty.

Afterword

Project Civil City was terminated on 13 February 2009 by Vancouver's newly elected mayor, Gregor Robertson (City of Vancouver, Work par. 1). Initiatives undertaken in response to Project Civil City recommendations are ongoing. These include increased fines for by-law infractions, enhanced municipal ticketing enforcement powers, and a number of community

empowerment initiatives to encourage local responses to neighbourhood-level public disorder (City of Vancouver, High 7-11). Downtown revitalization initiatives to beautify the city in anticipation of the coming 2010 Olympics also continue (City of Vancouver, Major par. 1-3). Although Robertson ran on a campaign to significantly reduce homelessness, and proposes to expedite the development of social housing in Vancouver, it is unclear what his position on

public disorder is generally. While he appears more sympathetic to the plight of Vancouver's disadvantaged street population than Sam Sullivan, Mayor Robertson's apparent lack of interest in modifying or terminating some of Project Civil City's spinoff initiatives suggests a softer but continued adherence to "broken windows" style public policy.

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